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Chapter 3
Why the Mainstream Economic Paradigm
Cannot Inform Sustainability
Transformations
The theory they developed is known as neoclassical economics. Today it still forms the
basis of orthodox theory, and makes up the core curriculum taught to future economists and
business leaders in universities and business schools around the world. As a set of ideas, it
might be the most powerful in modern history.
David Orrell, Economyths: Ten Ways Economics Gets it Wrong (2010: 13).
Wherever we look around the world, conventional economic thinking remains the principal
source of solutions. Somehow, it is suggested, we must ﬁnd ways of harnessing those
forces that have got us into such trouble—self-interest and greed, harnessed to technology
—to get us out.
Chandran Nair, Consumptionomics: Asia’s Role in Reshaping Capitalism and Saving the
Planet (2011: 62).
Economic thought did not adjust to the changed conditions it helped to create; thereby it
continued to legitimate, and indeed directly to cause, massive and rapid ecological change.
The overarching priority of economic growth was easily the most important idea of the
twentieth century.
J.R. McNeill, Something New Under the Sun (2001: 336).
Long before I discovered Polanyi, my decision to study political economy was a
key turning point in my quest to ﬁnd an answer to the question of why we,
collectively, do not create the sustainable world that we, as individuals, wish for.
While ﬁnishing a degree in media and communications, (surely, I thought, “we just
need to get the information out!”) I added sociology, psychology, political science
and global governance to my courses in order to understand the gap between
knowledge and practice that I had detected. It was, however, a seminar on
macroeconomics that made me feel I was coming closer to understanding why
sustainability remains merely an aspiration. This discipline seemed to be devoid of
all the insights that I had taken away from the humanities and social sciences.
I will never forget how I was taught the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, for example.
It explains why countries with low wages specialize in labor-intensive production
and those with high wages develop production that requires more capital. Because
of the factor price advantage of, for example, ﬁsheries (more capital needed) over
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agriculture (more labor intensity possible), a country with easily accessed capital
would focus on ﬁshing and scale down its agricultural sector, and a country with
cheap labor would prioritize farming over trawling. As a consequence they would
quickly beneﬁt: convert the boats into farms and up shoot the exports. In the
calculations for the basic model, this conversion is assumed to be free of costs and
involve a workforce that instantly migrates to wherever work is available. When I
asked if its adherents really believed that people would not ﬁnd it very costly to
uproot their entire way of life simply because of the current terms of trade, the
professor gave me a stunning response: “Oh dear, a warm heart speaking.”
Confused as to why a cold heart was a good thing, or at least a prerequisite for
believing in mainstream economic models, I used my PhD to study theory of
science and the history of economic thought as well as global political economy,
institutionalism theories and the role of law. I continued to be drawn into what I
described as the reflexive approaches that I put emphasis on with the concept of
materiality of ideas in Fig. 2.5.
In the summary of Chap. 2, I discussed the way that the term ‘ideas’ captures
more than simple flashes of thought, mere slogans or buzzwords. This chapter is
about zooming in on some ideas that have been instrumental in shaping the pro-
cesses and systems we live in today. According to Morten Bøås and Desmond
McNeill, who have researched the role of ideas in the forming of institutions, these
ideas have “some reputable intellectual basis,” but they “may nevertheless be found
vulnerable on analytical and empirical grounds.” What is special about such ideas,
they argue, is that they are “able to operate in both academia and policy domains”
(Bøås/McNeill 2004: 1).
In the following I will identify some key ideas that, if changed, could induce a
paradigm shift and thus trigger a very high leverage point in unlocking unsus-
tainable path dependencies. I think the Brundtland Commission was already at this
point when it urged for the “need to integrate economic and ecological consider-
ations in decision making” because this is how the workings of the real world
operate. The commission also pointed out that this will “require a change in atti-
tudes and objectives and in institutional arrangements at every level” (WCED 1987:
55). So this chapter seeks to improve futures literacy: people’s capacity to imagine
futures that are not based on hidden, unexamined, and sometimes flawed
assumptions about present and past systems. It hopes to serve the spirit of jointly
tackling the structures and path dependencies that keep us, collectively, from
bringing about the sustainable world that we, individually, wish for and have agreed
to guide our policies toward.
As stated earlier, my goal is not to provide a detailed historical assessment of
theoretical and methodological intricacies but to show how strong the influence of
some basic economic ideas born in the Enlightenment era remains in
decision-making and its rationalization or justiﬁcations today. This is why I zoom
in on a few key concepts that are customarily applied when deciding how to put the
goals of sustainable development into practice: delivering on the needs of current
generations while safeguarding the means of need satisfaction for future ones. The
1992 Rio Declaration included the agreement that such development should
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prioritize two key points. These were “the concept of ‘needs,’ in particular the
essential needs of the world’s poor,” to whom, it argued, “overriding priority should
be given” and “the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social
organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs”
(WCED 1987: 41).
To reach these goals the Brundtland Commission urged that: “Human laws must
be reformulated to keep human activities in harmony with the unchanging and
universal laws of nature” (WCED 1987: 271). We will see that mainstream eco-
nomic theory does not provide much understanding as to how to do this but rather
offers concepts that keep us blind to these key points. The urge to ‘integrate’
environmental, social and economic concerns led to the expansion of the economic
mind-set into the governance of ever more areas of life. This effect has been called
the ‘economization’ of societies and its ongoing trending reiﬁes unsustainable path
dependencies instead of helping to unlock them. So it is at least as important to limit
the realm of issues to which economics are applied as it is to update the entire
discipline.
So to what questions do economists claim to provide answers? Perhaps the most
widely used and accepted deﬁnition was coined by Lionel Robbins, the famous
London School of Economics professor who wrote in 1932 that “Economics is the
science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce
means which have alternative uses” (Robbins 1932: 15). Such alternative uses are
also called ‘competing ends’ and Robbins argues that the only situations that fall
under economic consideration are those in which choices between ends (going to
the opera, sleeping or baking bread) need to be taken because the means (time or
resources) are limited. Hence, economic situations are those in which some wants
need to be relinquished. This means that economics can explain choice making, but
cannot shed light on either ends or means. In fact, it was the aim of Robbins’ essay
to limit the concerns addressed by economics.
This focus is reflected in the key ideas and concepts that it puts forward and that
I have summarized in Table 3.1.
All the ideas in the left column clearly ﬁt into the overarching Enlightenment
movement that started in the seventeenth century. Its ambition to free humanity
from superstitious, theological, and natural limitations to progress generated a
rather mechanistic-additive view of systems and the world. Each of the economic
Table 3.1 Mainstream economic paradigm effects on searching for sustainable development
Source Own overview
3 Why the Mainstream Economic Paradigm Cannot Inform … 55
concepts in the second and third column of this table can best be understood by
remembering that they were born in an era when
• the emphasis lay on the human intellect and its capacity to dissect complex
processes and investigate them empirically;
• natural scientism and its law-like predictions of developments replaced religion
as the prime source of explanations of the world;
• discourse around natural limits to population size met an energy revolution that
fuelled the managerial-industrial drive to improve productivity; and
• the securing of private property and pursuit of self-interest became basic tenets
of citizens’ freedom and were declared important drivers of progress.
Modernity and neoclassical economic developments of the twentieth century
have continued to employ the same mechanistic-additive view and basic concepts,
pushing quantiﬁed modeling and its extrapolating predictions into yet more dom-
inance when computation made massive calculations possible. There is no emphasis
on a deep or diversiﬁed understanding of the ends that transactions should serve
(human need satisfaction) or the scarce means that are required (nature’s resources).
These are subsumed into the container terms ‘utility’ and ‘(natural) capital.’ This is
in line with Robbins’ deﬁnition and understandable when reflecting back on the
context in which these concepts were born. Saturation with goods and services was
reserved for a very small part of the population and poverty was widespread. It was
rational to equate more with better. Meanwhile, in a world of one billion people
with plenty of ‘undiscovered’ territories, there was simply no expectation that more
effective exploitation of nature would threaten its health and existence.
From a transformation point of view it is thus easily understood why the
Enlightenment movement claimed the term ‘liberalism’: its ideas inspired collective
action toward overcoming an old system that no longer delivered (as far as
Enlightenment protagonists were concerned). The premise was to overcome the
‘dark’ epoch of the Middle Ages. These ideas were key aspects of a paradigm shift
that ﬁrst challenged the old order and its legitimizing narrative and later, as Polanyi
showed, served as the gelling consensus between philosophers, scientists, busi-
nessmen, politicians and even church representatives working on alternative
institution-building and rule-formulation. Polanyi also concluded that imagining all
of society as one big market system and treating humans, nature, and money as
ﬁctitious commodities inevitably leads to sustainability problems.
So here we come to an interesting question: if Robbins says that the application
of economic concepts should be limited to situations of exchanges and choice
making but Polanyi argues that all aspects of the planet have been subsumed under
the imaginary and logic of a market system, where does the application of eco-
nomics end? Having analyzed current discourse and observed the marketization and
privatization trends of the last 30 years I would say that their application is almost
ubiquitous—and that is precisely the problem. It means that neither ends nor means
become the center of attention and investigation. Instead, it focuses only on the
choice-making of selﬁshly calculating and insatiable individuals. The 250-year-old
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innovation of reorganizing all of society around endless gain goals remains
unchallenged.
Yet, we now know that there are limits to individual gain, all the more so on a
planet with nine to ten billion inhabitants. We also know that the notion that having
more means feeling better or happier very much depends, in reality, on the cir-
cumstances. Surely, when we seek transformational changes toward sustainable
development we cannot use a theory that has not integrated these contextual
changes in its concepts? The pursuit of endless gain, as Polanyi points out, had
never before in history been “raised to the level of justiﬁcation of action and
behavior in everyday life” (ibid 1957: 30). So it seems obvious both that it is time to
repurpose our societies again and that we cannot accept a theory that cannot
inductively inform but only deductively reinterpret civilizational changes to ﬁt the
universal concepts it has thought up.
Any new Great Transformation needs a different guiding paradigm if its outcome
is to improve sustainability. A paradigm that puts needs (ends) and nature (means)
center stage instead of hiding them in container terms. One that embraces some
empiricism and qualitative reasoning once more. We need a Second Enlightenment
ﬁt for what is now known to be a very complex and full world. Luckily, natural and
social sciences have moved on and freed themselves from the ideals of
positivist-deductive reasoning and quantitative measuring that accompanied
modernity. Only mainstream economics has fallen strangely behind in this
evolution.
This chapter deals with that evolution. It runs through the columns of the table
and ﬁrst discusses the origins and applications of the concepts for understanding
and organizing human need satisfaction, and then the origins and applications of the
concepts for understanding and engaging with nature. The subchapters argue that
the concepts are insufﬁcient for any transformational sustainable development
agenda and are in fact instrumental in perpetuating an unsustainable development
path. Then I will add brief overviews of what twenty-ﬁrst century social sciences,
humanities, psychology, neurosciences, quantum physics and also alternative
sub-strands of economics say that ﬁlls the black boxes of human needs and nature’s
laws.
3.1 How Mainstream Economics Views Human Needs
and Their Satisfaction
How do we satisfy the needs of current generations while safeguarding resources
for future generations? First we must understand people, their needs and what
motivates them to do certain things. Mainstream economics does not make much
use of the term ‘needs’ but has instead adopted the concept of ‘utility.’
The term was invented by the philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), who
described human existence as being based on a hedonic calculus or continuous
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hedonic flow of pleasure or pain. The prime goal of existence was to maximize
happiness calculated as the sum of pleasure minus pain. Thus the utility of a certain
product or practice expresses a cost–beneﬁt or pain–pleasure trade-off calculation
that people undertake when making choices. Since there is no such thing as one
‘util,’ the numerical formula became money: the purchase decisions of people
indicate what they want and the price indicates how highly it ranks on their list of
preferences. This willingness to pay expresses the utility and thus happiness they
gain from consumption of, for example, ice cream, and the loss of what they give
up for it, for example, money or their skills in lawn mowing.
This way of measuring utility through willingness to pay was also called
‘working with revealed preferences.’ It allowed for the building of mathematical,
thus scientiﬁc models. Combined with the assumption that humans are insatiable
when it comes to happiness or utility, this became the ﬁrst ‘law’ of the human
condition. It also supports the basic premise of ubiquitous and eternal scarcity
(scarce means) that Robbins’s 1932 deﬁnition of economics carries: since our wants
are endless we are constantly worried about how to get more of them satisﬁed and
where we will ﬁnd those resources. For Robbins, this means not only natural and
material resources but also services that are per se limited. His deﬁnition restricts
the path for need satisfaction—e.g., eating or leisure—entirely to market relations:
“Both the services of cooks and the services of opera dancers are limited in relation
to demand and can be put to alternative uses” (ibid.: 15).
In this paradigm, trading and bartering are the essence of all relationships.
Human existence means constantly improving one’s balance sheet. In order for this
model to work, it is assumed that actors undertake this improvement rationally,
although this paradigm has a very narrow deﬁnition of rationality: it is understood
as knowing all possible strategies available in a particular situation, knowing the
outcomes of each of those—including the behavior of others—and ranking all of
the possible outcomes according to the preferences as measured by utility (money).
So all relationships with other humans and nature are driven by the hedonic
calculus and thus best governed by markets. The societal vision of a market system
is born. The basic ‘law’ of this system is that of supply and demand. It suggests
that, given unlimited wants, every product and service will always ﬁnd a customer
once the price is right. This law has resulted in the famous prediction that markets
will always tend toward equilibrium: if I cannot get satisfying prices any longer
(demand goes down or too many competitors are around), I will reduce production
(supply goes down).
On these two laws all models of mainstream economics have been built. The
impact of the Enlightenment movement has been studied by several scholars. David
Orrell, Canadian mathematician and author of Economyths. Ten Ways Economics
Gets it Wrong, muses: “Just as Newton believed that matter is made up of minute
particles that bump off one another but are otherwise unchanged, so mainstream
theory assumes that the economy is made up of unconnected individuals who
interact by exchanging goods and services and money but are otherwise unchan-
ged” (Orrell 2010: 13).
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Eric Beinhocker, the director of the Institute for New Economic Thinking at
Oxford, tells the story of Walras, the mastermind of market equilibrium models.
Inspired by his father’s declaration that one of the great challenges remaining from
the nineteenth century was a scientiﬁc theory of economics, Walras spent 14 years
working toward a mathematical theory that built on Bentham’s utility and the
related law of supply and demand to make economic systems predictable. After
presenting his market equilibrium equations, Walras concluded that his “pure
theory of economics is a science which resembles the physio-mathematical sciences
in every respect” (Beinhocker 2007: 36, citing Walras).
Beinhocker explains that models built on these laws do not capture what science
knows about behavior, decision-making and complex system dynamics today. Yet,
they are still used to predict future developments and to derive policy
recommendations:
Through the 1990s, economic researchers typically started with a set of principles: for
example, utility-maximizing by consumers and proﬁt-maximizing for ﬁrms, far-sighted
individual rationality, and a belief in equilibrium, which meant that structurally, individ-
ual’s decisions in the models ﬁt reasonably well together.…By the late twentieth century,
these principles formed the core of economists’ vision of reality, in the sense that all
economic models were built on these principles, or around variations of these principles
like assumptions of bounded rationality or imperfect information (Beinhocker 2007: 460,
citing Collander 1999).
According to all of these models, more production is always better and the price
paid indicates the utility gained from consuming that production. The policy con-
clusions are easy: meeting the needs of current and future generations means
ramping up productivity as much as we can. This has been the prime goal of policy
and business conduct. Yet, upping the productivity of the ﬁctitious commodity
labor means changing the work life of humans. And often also ending the work life
of humans. What happens to human needs in this process is, as we will see, not part
of the models.
3.1.1 What Is Utility and Where Is It Created?
This section continues the search for an understanding of how human needs can be
satisﬁed and unpacks the concept of utility and its consumption-based deﬁnition.
Digging beneath the market-price indicator for utility (willingness to pay) we see
something that psychologists have called the ‘process beneﬁts’ or ‘experienced
utility’ of the individuals involved in producing what can later be bought. It may
well decline if the amount of what is done in one hour by one person is constantly
ramped up. Or, in accounting terms, the amount paid for the same output falls. This
is what productivity stands for in its conventional deﬁnition.
The goal of contemporary psychologists and the economic Nobel Prize-winner
Daniel Kahneman has been to shed some empirical light on the pleasure and pain
that people experience during their everyday activities. His surveys seek to capture
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the happiness of an individual over a period of time, e.g., while working.
Experienced utility is deﬁned “as the sum of the momentary utilities over that time
period; that is, the temporal integral of momentary utility” (Kahneman/Krueger
2006: 5).
So, instead of measuring my utility and happiness solely through my shopping
expenditures, these surveys seek to capture how much pleasure or pain I experience
in every situation throughout the day. This sheds a very different light on notions of
how we can support human need satisfaction but also requires a change to some of
the basic models with which production processes are captured and analyzed.
This is the domain where ecological economics has anchored some of its most
important alternative perspectives. Some of its leading thinkers, like Robert
Costanza, Joshua Farley, Hermann Daly or Paul Ekins have juxtaposed wealth
production functions in mainstream economics with those that capture people and
planet and make them part of the economy. The following are my own synopses of
slightly diverse versions in several publications (Ekins 1992: 147–155; Costanza
et al. 1997: 273–275; Ekins 2000: 52–54). Figure 3.1 shows the production func-
tion of an economy as portrayed by mainstream economists.
We see that utility sits at the very end of the production process where con-
sumption has resulted in proﬁt for the producer and the pleasure of the buyer who has
consumed the goods. Thus, an increase in consumption is identical to an increase in
utility or need satisfaction. This model lacks information on both input and output—
the (scarce) means of production and the potentials for utility creation (the ends).
This results in two limits to attention and creativity in thinking about economic
development, which are highlighted by ecological economists who add some boxes
and arrows to the graph (Fig. 3.2). In particular, they amend two categories: the
Fig. 3.1 Mainstream economics model of wealth and utility production. Source Based on Ekins
(1992, 2000) and Costanza et al. (1997)
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factors of production and the stages at which utility or disutility can be created
during the process. The former introduced the now widely adopted four-fold concept
of capital that will become relevant below when discussing how economists antic-
ipate the future, whereas the latter is what I am interested in here: aspects of human
existence that escape the category of product or service consumption.
• Land is now portrayed as environmental capital and its understanding is
expanded by adding ecological services. These have a utility or well-being effect
outside of economic processes through, for example, beauty and recreation in
lush forests or meadows. The three economic roles are the provision of
resources like minerals, grains, wood or stone; of direct ecosystem services like
climatic regulation or fresh water; and supplying a sink to absorb waste, like
composting organic waste into humus.
• So waste is included as an explicit category that economic processes and con-
sumption create. It will affect utility (pleasure) directly if it stinks or pollutes the
air, and it impacts the regenerative circuits in ecological systems services.
• The concept of labor has been transformed into human capital that includes not
only the execution of production tasks but also the psychological, emotional and
social skills around them such as motivation, knowledge, creativity and health.
Also new is social capital, which embodies the relationships, norms, and pro-
cedures or institutions with which production is organized. Both are positively
influenced not only by investments but also by the general level of utility and
well-being on the side of the people involved—e.g., positive spirals of moti-
vation, mutual support, a sense of accomplishment. This effect flows in both
Fig. 3.2 A differentiated model of wealth and utility production. Source Own illustration based
on Ekins (1992, 2000) and Costanza et al. (1997)
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directions, as good social and human capital tends to lead to higher degrees of
reported well-being and experienced utility.
• So utility is seen to have many sources, flowing from the entire production
process as well as the quality of the consumption process of the product or
service I paid for. Do I sit down on a bench in the sun or do I slurp my ice cream
behind the steering wheel, rushing home to feed the kids? This process quality
of utility is highlighted by the introduction of four modes of engagement which
we will discuss in more detail below: The mode of being, e.g., the enjoyment of
a high quality environment or the discomfort due to a high level of waste or
pollution in the air. Also: does my job context make me feel challenged and
supported in a meaningful way to develop my skills? The mode of having
results primarily from consumption but also directly from the natural assets to
one’s availability. In the mode of doing it is important how the work process is
set up and if I, for example, feel safe and in control, whereas the mode of
relating or interacting captures all the social organizational structures, e.g., do
we have enough breaks and can we talk to each other, or is the work process
interactive (see Ekins 1992: 147–155).
• The last difference lies in the way in which cultural norms and policies impact
consumption and investment preferences. Here, choices have the potential to
evolve rather than be ﬁxed. This quality of change goes beyond the changes in
preference ordering that mainstream economics includes to, for example, cap-
ture me being fed up with cars and now liking bicycles: it might mean instead
that individual choices and cultural norms shift toward not wanting to consume
more because people feel they have enough (Costanza et al. 1997: 273–275).
This comparison makes three points that are very important for the sustainability
agenda. First, how the mainstream economic view ignores any direct utility gains
from intact nature as well as the often damaging effects that waste, as a result of
production and consumption, has on the future quality of ecosystems. At some
point we might get to mimicking nature’s symbiotic relations, in which the waste of
one process serves as the input factor of the next. Yet, such cradle-to-cradle designs
remain the talk of the future, and in order to transform our production and con-
sumption systems accordingly the models must provide the information we need.
Secondly, it highlights the fact that the mainstream cost-based input–output
models of production say nothing about the pleasure–pain impact of participating in
such guided production processes. Here we ﬁnd the connection with the concept of
experienced utility and the limitation of accounting for utility or happiness only in
the role of consumers: most of us are also workers and spend much more time in
this role than in the one of shoppers.
Thirdly, and relatedly, it shows the massive blind spots that a
consumption-based model of utility generation brings to thinking about solutions
for less resource-intensive need-satisfaction strategies. It says that we only thrive
when we shop or eat or watch television, while working is an unfortunate necessity
to generate the money we need for that. We have to trade the production factor
labor for income so we can buy more happiness.
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Given that most people spend many more hours of most days working than
consuming, this blind spot is huge. It also raises several questions that the differ-
entiated model in Fig. 3.2 picks up on: Do humans not enjoy engaging in pro-
ductive activities? Do we not all participate in providing and receiving services like
cooking or dancing without pay? So why not emphasize need satisfaction during
productive processes instead of sacriﬁcing them to serve sacrosanct productivity
goals? What have we gained if there are ever more goods and services to choose
from but we have no time to really enjoy them anymore? Yes, willingness to pay for
compensatory measures and convenient ‘to-go’ solutions might even increase, but
does this really indicate overall better need satisfaction?
3.1.2 Is ‘Having’ Really All the Fun There Is?
Manfred Max-Neef developed a helpful tool to understand human needs that
increases the creative imaginary space for sustainable innovations that target
experienced utility and well-being. This popular Chilean development economist
has called himself the “barefoot economist” after spending 12 years with the
poorest communities in Latin America. His moment of revelation came when
understanding that none of the mainstream market-based economic concepts were
of any relevance to them. Much of his work has thus been built on proper empirical
experience in non-marketized societies. It therefore provides some fascinating
reflexive systemic insight into the effect that living with certain institutional setups
has on the way actors see and experience the world.
In an interview with Democracy Now! Max-Neef explained that his return to
immersing himself in experience rather than deducing theoretical models made him
conclude that we need an entirely new language in order to understand better what
people really need. According to him, mainstream economics has nothing to say in
support of the poorest people in the world if strategies are supposed to emerge from
local systems rather than disrupting them. If you live in poverty, behaving like the
selﬁsh, insatiable atomic accumulator of mainstream theory won’t get you very far,
says Max-Neef: “You cannot be an idiot if you want to survive; you need networks
of cooperation and mutual aid.” In those communities, he observed, competition
and the promise of monetary gain are not required for people to demonstrate
enormous creativity, innovation and willingness to collaborate (Max-Neef 2010).
To illustrate which fundamental human needs he observed instead, Max-Neef
has developed a matrix whose key messages I summarized in Table 3.2. The matrix
limits the number of existential human needs to approximately nine. He does not
argue that the list of nine existential needs is deﬁnitive or set in stone, but he says he
is conﬁdent that a change in those basic needs would at best occur at a very slow
pace. Also, these needs should be understood as interrelated and without hierar-
chies, except for the need of subsistence or survival, which comes ﬁrst (Max-Neef
1992: 204–205). Here Max-Neef differs from other need-satisfaction approaches,
many of which place self-actualization at the top and social, as well as material
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Table 3.2 Max-Neef’s matrix of fundamental human needs
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needs, at the bottom. The assumption is that physical and social needs require
fulﬁllment before more transcendent ones can be realized. Max-Neef rejects such a
hierarchical ordering and says that even if people go hungry every day, their lives
can still host relationships of dignity, creative moments of productivity and the
feeling of connection with others (Max-Neef 1992: 204–205).
The column of being lists personal or collective attributes; having registers
institutions, norms, mechanisms, laws or tools in the material sense; doing relates to
personal or collective actions; and the ﬁnal column of interacting lists locations and
milieus as deﬁned in time and space. Max-Neef explains that this last existential
category is much better captured in the German term ‘beﬁnden’ or the Spanish
‘estar,’ as they combine a space with a state of being (ibid. 1992: 207).
What the matrix highlights is that having is only one way of satisfying existential
needs and that products like food or shelter are not a need as such, but instead a
satisﬁer of the need of subsistence. All products are thus viewed in relation to the
satisfying strategy they fulﬁll. The desirability of economic goods like, in his
example, books, laboratory instruments, tools, or computers, only comes from the
role they play in strategies of satisfying needs. They are vehicles in actualizing the
need for understanding through the satisfying strategies of investigating, studying,
experimenting, educating, etc., that he grouped in the column doing. Here, products
become the deduced variable and culture, context and resources determine which
are most suitable—or sustainable. It also means that widespread individual book
ownership or the simple presence of many books with high prices does not equate
to better need satisfaction—an equation that mainstream economics would make.
On the contrary, the process of understanding is often less painful or much more
pleasurable if you have a peer group with which to discuss things or a parent
reading out loud to you.
So according to Max-Neef, “a satisﬁer is in an ultimate sense the way in which a
need is expressed,” while “goods are in a strict sense the means by which indi-
viduals will empower the satisﬁers to meet their needs” (Max-Neef 1992: 202).
Also, one satisﬁer can actualize different needs at different times and several needs
at the same time, depending on how the process of creating goods or consuming
them is organized. Mainstream economics lacks such differentiations. Here, com-
modities bring utility through their consumption, as the willingness to pay for them
indicates. The amount of utility generated can be measured and compared to other
sources through the indicator of price. So the utility of books, for example, pops up
only in moments when they are sold (again).
Table 3.2 (continued)













Source Excerpt from Max-Neef (1992: 206–207)
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In the matrix, even the mode of having includes many elements that are very
difﬁcult to quantify and monetize, like human rights, insurance systems, and edu-
cational policies. Mainstream economics tries to use willingness-to-pay surveys to
judge their importance to people. People might be asked how much in monetary
terms a public health insurance system should cost per capita. But a simple twist in
the question will change the answer: asking whether they have to pay to keep
something renders different results from asking how much they would want to be
paid as compensation for it being taken away. So just checking the price will not get
you far in understanding the complete picture of how and why certain choices are
being made or which needs exactly are satisﬁed through it.
This is also one of the conclusions of Well-Being for Public Policy by
world-leading well-being psychologists Ed Diener and John Helliwell. It compiles
the research of many psychological studies on the relationship between willingness
to pay, income and the well-being that people report in surveys to conclude that “the
economic decisions that people make, and the money that they have, may not be
perfect indicators of the well-being that they experience” (Diener et al. 2009: 40).
The most important message of Max-Neef’s matrix in terms of a Great
Mindshift, however, lies even beyond exposing blind spots of monetization and
price indicators. It declares the set of human needs to be limited and the range of
possible satisﬁers to be abundant once the economistic consumption lens is
removed. This is in direct contrast to the standard economic assumption of
unlimited human needs and scarce resources, and it opens up a plethora of possible
solutions for good lives which do not have to cost the Earth. The satisﬁers listed in
Table 3.2 provide only a few examples. Consequently, the goal of development can
become a holistic and endlessly creative endeavor of keeping environmental and
human relations responsive to an unfolding of satisfying potentials, so that material
goods serve satisﬁer strategies in alignment with contextually speciﬁc
circumstances.
The mainstream model, on the other hand, makes material goods the ends in and
of themselves and assumes that all need-satisfying springs from them. This means
that successful development can only be imagined as linear in one direction: more
gain. Slowing down and reducing production cannot be a strategy because then
well-being will drop. According to Max-Neef, adopting this worldview means that
“the speed of production and the diversiﬁcation of objects have become ends in
themselves and as such are no longer able to satisfy any need whatsoever. People
have grown more dependent on this system of production but, at the same time,
more alienated from it” (Max-Neef 1992: 204).
Max-Neef therefore criticizes prevailing development policies, which are pri-
marily aimed at increasing consumption possibilities by market integration. They
stimulate the accumulation of goods regardless of human development status in
those systems. This results in an increasing dependence on externally generated
satisﬁers, whose control lies beyond the influence of poor communities.
One example of this has been the structural adjustment programs of the
International Monetary Fund in the 1980s, in which many poor countries had to
embark on export-driven development strategies. This means the focus lay on the
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comparative advantage of a few goods whose production was ramped up for
international competition. It sometimes meant that entire economies became
dependent on the world market price of one or two products. This had some
cataclysmic effects. The fates of Ethiopia, Burundi, and Uganda when the world
price of coffee fell in 2001 are prime examples (Francis/Francis 2011). It also meant
that the diversity of what was harvested at home was reduced signiﬁcantly, leading
to a simultaneous dependence on world market prices for imports. This type of
double dependency becomes especially problematic when world prices are affected
not simply by actual supply and demand changes but, as price hikes of up to 200 %
for some grains showed in 2006–2008, food is also susceptible to ﬁnancial
speculation.
In addition, as the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
points out in its 2013 Trade and Development Report, producing for the world
market means that every cent in wages is a cost to be avoided. Production for
domestic markets, on the other hand, means that higher wages mean more pur-
chasing power on the demand side. From a macroeconomic perspective this beneﬁts
everyone because price elasticity goes up. UNCTAD points out that statistics from
almost all export-driven countries demonstrate how real wages in the export sectors
have not increased with productivity gains over the last two decades. Coupling this
with slow growth and demand on a global scale leads the authors of the report to
conclude that “export-driven development is no longer viable” and that “economies
will perform better with more balanced strategies” aimed at “balanced growth” and
“a greater role of domestic demand” (UNCTAD 2013).
Long before these empirical numbers were gathered, Max-Neef had been
arguing that human need-satisfaction strategies should emerge from each individual
context, respectful of social practices, forms of organization, political models and
values as well as the natural systems in which they are embedded. This may lead to
less rapid increases in economic output as measured in GDP, but ensures a more
balanced and therefore resilient change process controlled by the people it affects.
Once the need for subsistence is no longer threatened, it may well deliver more
happiness than running after GDP per capita jumps.
3.1.3 Checking Human Happiness and the Link
with Income
The scholars cited at the beginning of this chapter second Polanyi in his assessment
that making endless gain or growth the polestar of societal aspiration might have
been the most transformational idea of the Enlightenment movement. It overarches
the third prime idea in mainstream economics: the pursuit of greater happiness or
utility (need satisfaction) is best done through more consumption. While the sub-
chapters above have shown the limiting blind spots of these reductionist models of
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where and how utility can be generated, this one is going to scrutinize the idea that
more is always better.
In mainstream economics more income always means better lives, as expressed,
for example, in the important indicator of GDP per capita in poverty and welfare
statistics. Yet, the fallacy of conflating income levels with need satisfaction and
well-being can be exposed by crunching the numbers. Researchers have discovered
that the level of reported well-being and happiness (which, in economics jargon, is
called ‘perceived utility status’), stops being causally linked to GDP growth once a
certain level of income per capita is reached. This observation is called the Easterlin
Paradox after Richard Easterlin, the American economist who pioneered research in
this ﬁeld in the 1970s.
The most striking example of decoupling rising GDP and per capita income from
perceived quality of life was revealed in the results of a Gallup poll in China. Some
15,000 people were interviewed between 1994 and 2005 and the researchers found
that average life satisfaction had gone down despite a rise in real incomes of 250 %
(Kahneman/Krueger 2006: 16).
There has been heated debate over this issue and the quality of data in some of
the measurements over time (time series). However, the ﬁrst World Happiness
Report (2013) issued by some of the world’s leading happiness and well-being
researchers—John Helliwell, Richard Layard and Jeffrey Sachs—collates a lot of
data from diverse sources and shows that the Easterlin Paradox is not so paradoxical
after all. Once the standard economic assumption that more income naturally means
more happiness is turned into an empirical research question, one comes to ﬁnd this
leveling off rather logical. The following presents some research results that support
this mindshift.
It was qualitative empirical meta-research conducted on subjective well-being
research that delivered most of the answers that solved the paradox. These affective
theories of well-being have experienced a renaissance since the 1960s. Before that,
modern post-Enlightenment science and the rise of behaviorism approaches in psy-
chology in the 1930s had excluded many of these approaches and insights from
consideration as ‘valid evidence.’ Instead, behaviorism ﬁts well with the goals of
economics as deﬁned by Robbins, explaining choice-making without understanding
people’s deeper motivations in detail. This period also marked an important turning
point when income began to be seen as an important indicator of well-being. The birth
of GDP in the 1940s complemented the turning with a macroeconomic indicator.
The scientiﬁc study of subjective human well-being only gradually re-emerged
in the 1960s and it took what was called an ‘affective revolution’ in the 1980s to
reinstall it ﬁrmly on the horizon of the social sciences—while economics remained
slow on the uptake (Diener et al. 2009: 15–16).
This revolution was about asking people how they felt. The ‘objective’ condi-
tions such as income, unemployment, and sanitary provision may be captured in
order to understand context but are not elevated to the status of indicators for utility
levels. In an overview article, Daniel Kahneman and his colleague Alan Krueger
argue, “that it is fruitful to distinguish among different conceptions of utility rather
than presume to measure a single, unifying concept that motivates all human
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choices and registers all relevant feelings and experiences” (Kahneman/Krueger
2006: 4). Their empirical ﬁndings support the amended production model (Fig. 3.2)
and the Max-Neef matrix (Table 3.2) in many ways. Most important for subjective
well-being are the quality of social relationships, the relative notion of income or
wealth and how sociocultural environments impact on people’s aspirations and
values.
So while these researchers also seek to understand how to maximize happiness
or utility, they make the effort of actually asking people what makes them feel good.
They investigate its sources empirically rather than simply saying that it will come
and grow with consumption. Also, Diener and Helliwell point out that many things,
like love, social relationships, environmental pollution, fair and effective gover-
nance and virtue and spirituality all play important roles in people’s experienced
well-being, but are difﬁcult if not impossible to measure through willingness-to-pay
estimates (Diener et al. 2009: 37). They also observe that quite often, individual
predictions of what will make for happiness go wrong.
So while most metrics and success benchmarks for progress and development
involve constantly upping per capita income, when asked, people tend to claim that
health, recognition and a meaningful engagement lie at the center of what makes
their lives satisfying. Chronic pain and unemployment are amongst the worst things
that can happen, in particular in societies where those not ﬁnding a job are viewed
as lazy beneﬁt-seekers or live with no social support and much reduced social
contact.
The influence of social norms on what we believe—or at least say we believe—
creates well-being has also been well documented. When comparing ratings on
work and childcare in surveys in which the respondents talked to a real person with
those where they anonymously press buttons on an app, the former type of survey
reveals higher rankings for childcare. According to Kahneman and Krueger they are
“likely to be reminded that both work and childcare are desirable aspects of their
life. Reports of how much they enjoy these activities will tend to be anchored in that
general assessment, resulting in a favorable bias. Respondents may also feel some
social pressure to tell interviewers that these domains of life are enjoyable”
(Kahneman/Krueger 2006: 13).
App technology, however, has now made it easy for people to report their
feelings during the day, while engaged in different activities. Grouped into three
positive categories (happy, warm, enjoying myself) and six negative ones (frus-
trated, depressed, hassled, angry, worried or criticized) individuals can select their
current state from zero (not at all) to six (very much). In this way answers are much
more immediate, and do not allow for time to reflect on the wider social context.
The results, say Kahneman and Krueger, indicate that net affect, also called
“mood score,” from these ratings “is highest, on average, when individuals are
engaged in leisure activities (such as socializing after work) and lowest when they
are engaged in market work and investment or personal maintenance activities
(such as house cleaning)” (Kahneman/Krueger 2006: 12). The morning commute is
viewed as particularly negative—unless it is undertaken in the company of others,
which again hints at the importance of social contact.
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What do these ﬁndings tell us about human needs, decision-making motivations
and the importance of a constantly growing number of possessions? They indicate
that Easterlin had not so much discovered a paradox as a natural development
process. This is indeed what Martin E.P. Seligman, another renowned positive
psychologist, seems to conclude in an overview article on well-being studies:
economic indicators are extremely useful in analyzing societies in their early stages
when the fulﬁllment of basic material needs is important but “as societies grow
wealthy, however, differences in well-being are less frequently due to income, and
are more frequently due to factors such as social relationships and enjoyment at
work” (Diener/Seligman 2004: 1).
None of this provides much support for any law-like equation of more economic
output with more happiness for everyone. If societies are built around this equation,
it results in pathways of development and civilizations that psychologists have
diagnosed as resembling a ‘hedonic treadmill.’
In the 1970s researchers started investigating the relatively small and short-lived
effects caused by changes in people’s circumstances. They observed people who
had suffered lasting setbacks to their health or had been afflicted with disabilities.
The results showed that within two years most had returned to the average life
satisfaction they had reported before their misfortune. Only those with severe
disabilities did not fully recover.
The same leveling out holds true in the case of important positive events like
marriage. Reported well-being typically increases one year before and after the
actual event before returning to the mean. Purely economic gains like a salary
increase or buying and enjoying a new car show the same adaptation effects but the
return to the norm is much faster (Kahneman/Krueger 2006: 14).
In the 1990s, Michael Eysenck, a British psychologist, formulated the hedonic
treadmill analogy as a generalization of these ﬁndings: the more you have, the more
your expectations rise and the more things you want. So it is not so much the
absolute number of possessions that matters but the relative amount of what we
have and against which we judge changes (Eysenck 1990). So even with a high
income, instead of being happy with what you have, you think that having more
will make you happier. This is especially true when your society promotes ever
more possibilities of consumption and richer lifestyles. One great example of this is
the income levels deemed necessary for having a good life in the United States. The
median estimate of Americans as to how much income they felt they needed to
“fulﬁll all of [their] dreams” was approximately $50,000 in 1987 and rose to
$90,000 by 1996—in constant dollars (Bok 2010: 13).
Other impressive survey results with the same message were cited by Stephen
Marglin, a Harvard economist in The Dismal Science: How Thinking Like an
Economist Undermines Community (2010). He refers to a 2005 PNC Bank survey
of wealthy individuals.
When asked how much they needed to feel ﬁnancially secure in the future, respondents
consistently cited a need to approximately double their current level of assets. Those with
$10 million or more felt they needed a median of $18.1 million; those with $5 million or
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more needed $10.4 million, and those with a half million to $1 million said they needed
$2.4 million (Marglin 2010: 200, citing PNC Advisors 2005).
So ﬁrst and foremost, people’s ideas about what they need increase in line with
what they have. Here, ﬁnancial security represents people’s perception of being
able to continue living the life they know. So, just taking numbers into consider-
ation does not tell you much about what people need in order to feel that their lives
are rich. Only if we contextualize survey data in the socioeconomic environment
can we start understanding the speciﬁc connections between income and
well-being. If, for example, former citizen entitlements like public health care,
education, pension schemes, etc., are increasingly turned into commodities sold in
the market, your access guarantee starts depending on your private wealth. Thus,
the more monetized and privatized a society’s relationships, the more central
income will be to people’s sense of security and the quality of goods and services
that they can afford. It does not necessarily mean that they also feel happy,
however.
The role of reliable income in feeling secure is conﬁrmed in many studies in
richer societies that ﬁnd secure income ranks higher than a growing absolute
amount. They also support the need to contextualize: connecting income level with
other losses, like a blow to health, for example, has shown that people with higher
incomes suffer a less dramatic drop in life satisfaction (Kahneman/Krueger 2006:
14). And in all societies the wealthier strata are on average happier than the poor.
As long as societies hold money to be the single most powerful access mech-
anism to experienced utility or need-satisfaction strategies, income will be very
important; but only as long as I can buy much more treatment and services to
alleviate my disabilities than I could get without private pay. Max-Neef has taught
us to understand the relationship between physical goods and artifacts like money
and the role they play in allowing for a need-satisfaction process to emerge.
Without such processes they are rather useless things.
So the use of qualitative ﬁndings to capture the relationships within a given
system in a holistic way gives rise to much better insights into the property and role
that individual elements play within it. Reflexive sciences would insist that the
characteristics of individual elements cannot be fully captured without checking for
the relationships in which they are embedded. In his 2010 meta-study on happiness
research and its relevance for policy, Derek Bok, former Harvard University
president, offers a rather anecdotal account of the relational beneﬁts that being rich
brings to people: “Their jobs tend to be more interesting, they have more control
over how they spend their time, and they are more likely to give orders than to
receive them. The mere fact that they have succeeded in what they set out to
achieve should make them more satisﬁed with their lives” (Bok 2010: 15). Here we
ﬁnd a lot of pointers for satisﬁers in the category of doing, being and relating, that
could be served with qualitative rather than quantitative changes in economic
processes like work. Max-Neef’s barefoot economist ﬁndings in poor communities
are seconded by data from rich societies: the range of possible satisﬁers is far wider
than what markets offer.
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Researchers concluded that it is attention that plays a crucial role for the quality
and intensity of an experience and that individual attention is high when something
is new. With time, however, the fraction of attention concentrated on the new thing
goes down and so does its influence on one’s general state of well-being. Working
with attention lies at the heart of mindfulness practices and therapeutic strategies
deployed to cure the increasing number of people that burn out in hedonic treadmill
civilizations.
Constantly keeping attention on what ubiquitous advertising is suggesting one
lacks in one’s life and what others have that is better is not a good recipe for
happiness. Neurosciences show that mental activity creates neuronal structures and,
depending on which skills people use most or what they pay attention to regularly,
some wirings and associations of their brain become more connected. Some parts
even grow physically bigger. So if societies create attention architectures that keep
people concentrated on accumulation and monetary expressions of value, this
influences their ideas about a good life, the best need-satisfaction strategies and,
ultimately, their experienced happiness (Hanson 2009: 18). Neurosciences and
biochemical research also tell us that a brain processing massive excitement would
fry if it did this over longer periods of time. Accumulating limitless stacks of
happiness is thus neither possible nor desirable. Happiness is a flow phenomenon
rather than a stock that can be hoarded. Its measurement takes place on a scale
between high and low and its levels are expected to fluctuate. It is not measured
with aggregated growth curves.
Psychologists like Tim Kasser provide more scientiﬁc evidence against the
conflation of more gain with more happiness, and also against the ‘law’ that all
humans are naturally wired toward competitive accumulation. He shows how
experienced well-being of even materially wealthy lives seems to decrease if too
much attention is given to economic indicators and the satisﬁer strategies of having.
3.1.4 How Does a Homo Economicus Feel and Act?
The technical term for what has become the ‘representative agent’ in mainstream
economic models is ‘Homo economicus.’ Its character is the embodiment of the ﬁrst
law of the human condition: constantly seeking to improve the hedonic calculus and
constantly comparing and competing with others over scarce resources and best
offers. The cost–beneﬁt analyses that this agent undertakes lie at the heart of
explaining human behavior and the choices that should be expected. The ﬁnancial
crisis has shown how helpful the resulting predictions are for complex real world
dynamics. But this is not the topic at hand.Wewant to staywith the assessment of how
key ideas and concepts of the mainstream economic paradigm not only limit which
development solutions are imaginable and justiﬁable but also how their incorporation
in culture and institutions drives societies away from sustainable outcomes.
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The latter is the theme of US psychologist Tim Kasser’s High Price of
Materialism. It collates ten years of psychological research that shows why we
should speak of the ‘Easterlin Logic’ rather than ‘paradox.’ Kasser provides rich
sociological evidence on the other claim that the choice of particular satisﬁers
impacts psychological and social development and thus future-need perception and
well-being. He does so by investigating how materialistic values relate to
well-being. The questions he seeks to answer are the following: “What happens to
our well-being when our desires and goals to attain wealth and accumulate pos-
sessions become prominent? What happens to our internal experience and inter-
personal relationship when we adopt the messages of consumer culture as personal
beliefs? What happens to the quality of our lives when we value materialism?”
(Kasser 2002: 4)
Values research is an important strand of psychology and in itself shows that not
all humans are materialistically wired. Box 3.1 provides a brief overview of how in
some research designs values have become an explicit component, next to questions
of epistemology, ontology and methodology.
Box 3.1 Values research—axiological aspects of scientiﬁc paradigms
Psychologists have found a relatively high commonality of basic value ori-
entation varieties across cultures and age groups and have grouped them into
ten meta-categories that subsume several single value statements and aspi-
rations or goals for life to which people holding these values would ascribe.
In all cultures one ﬁnds the following: universalism, benevolence, tradition,
conformity, security, power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, and
self-direction.
Individuals and cultures show different value sets with typical patterns of
correlation and non-correlation between some of these meta-categories. It is
unlikely, for example, that people with a high score in universalism will also
have a high score in power, whereas benevolence and self-direction will
typically rank highly together. These settings influence people’s aspirations,
judgments and behavior in a given context and the categories are applied
when seeking to understand differences in decision-making and support of
certain political or economic ideas and proposals. Approaches like that of the
Global Scenario Group presented here, base their stories for potential
developments on the assessments of sets of values and how these might
influence the decisions people take, in, for example, policies and
consumption.
For a wider discussion and a map of the typical category correlations and
single values within them, see the Common Cause Handbook of the British
Public Interest Research Centre (PIRC). It also includes instructions on how
to work with value change for improved well-being and sustainability.
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For his own research questions, Kasser selected people who put making money
and having possessions relatively high on their overall list of things they deemed
important. In order to ﬁnd this group, surveys were conducted with an ‘Aspiration
Index’ that listed a variety of goals which participants ranked according to their
importance. If someone ranked, for example, ﬁnancial success higher in comparison
to other goals like a good family life and friendships, it indicated a materialistic
value set on the index.
Each life goal was associated with descriptions of aspirations that have been
observed to relate to particular values like benevolence, self-direction, security,
power or hedonism. In the category of ﬁnancial success, for example, these
included “you will be your own boss,” “you will have a job with high social status,”
“you will have a job that pays well,” or “you will buy things just because you want
them.”
The study also documented aspirations in non-monetary goal categories like
‘image’ and ‘fame’ that competitive societies tend to treat with similar importance.
The commonality between these three goals is that they are extrinsic motivations,
which means they involve seeking a sense of worth outside oneself. Feeling worthy
thus depends on external rewards and the praise of others.
From a methodological point of view we can see how Kasser tested how people
who most closely resembled Homo economicus felt and how they experienced life.
The complete survey also had four questionnaires to assess the individual’s score on
two important well-being characteristics (self-actualization and vitality) and on the
two most common psychological disorders (depression and anxiety). The results
showed that people whose values were centered on the accumulation of wealth,
material possessions, or fame, faced a greater risk of unhappiness, including anx-
iety, depression, low self-esteem, and problems with intimacy, regardless of age,
income, or culture. Kasser repeated the study several times with different groups
and compared his ﬁndings with those of others. He added more extrinsic orientation
values like narcissism and used a more open methodology in which goals were not
assigned by providing pre-set aspirations but deﬁned by the individuals themselves.
Across the board he found the same picture emerging: “The more materialistic
values are at the center of our lives, the more our quality of life is diminished”
(Kasser 2002: 14).
Another group of researchers has found evidence that many who care a lot about
making money and succeed can offset the loss of well-being they experience by
sacriﬁcing aspects of their life like family or leisure time. Overall, however,
Kasser’s ﬁnding are supported, as Bok concludes in his meta-study, because “the
ﬁndings of psychologists convey a warning that being preoccupied with getting rich
carries a substantial risk of leaving one unhappy and disappointed in the end” (Bok
2010: 15).
The blurb accompanying Thrive, the 2014 bestseller by Arianna Hufﬁngton, puts
it this way: “Our relentless pursuit of the two traditional metrics of success—money
and power—has led to an epidemic of burnout and stress-related illnesses, and an
erosion in the quality of our relationships, family life, and, ironically, our careers.”
So, encouraging and training people to see and think like a Homo economicus
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seems like doubtful advice from a life coach and a terrible flaw in the discipline of
mainstream economics.
Kasser, however, went beyond individual happiness and also addressed the
question of what exactly social processes and institutions created with a Homo
economicus in mind do to the development of society. The results show that
materialistic people are possessive in the sense that they prefer to own and keep
things rather than borrow and rent, are less generous or more unwilling to share
their possessions, and envious of other people’s wealth. They also feel unhappy
when others have things they want.
Furthermore—and highly relevant to sustainability strategies—materialistic
values and pro-social values operate like a seesaw: people with high extrinsic value
sets are likely to show lower levels of intrinsic values like self-realization, psy-
chological growth or contributions to society that involve empathy for others or
concern for the environment (Kasser 2002: 18–19). Thus, materialistic values not
only reduce individual well-being and perpetuate feelings of insecurity and being
constrained, but they also hamper relationships with other people and the natural
environment. This effect is particularly strong when people have money on their
mind during decision-making.
Psychologists like James Heyman and Dan Ariely from Harvard University, for
example, demonstrated the difference between money markets in which ﬁnancial
compensation motivates action or effort, and social markets with no rewards, gifts
or other tokens. In three experiments they show that using “monetary payments
causes participants to invoke monetary-marketplace frames and norms” whereas
people are actually willing to expend more effort in exchange for no payment
(Heyman and Ariely 2004: 787).
Unlike mainstream economists, they use relational theory that distinguishes four
basic types of social relationships, of which only one is ‘market pricing,’ in which
cost–beneﬁt calculations dominate. The others are ‘communal sharing’ with a
dominant culture of ‘we-ness’; ‘authority ranking,’ which avoids the question of
who is ordering whom about and who is delivering; and ‘equality matching,’ in
which everyone gets the same rewards and reciprocity is monitored.
Heyman and Ariely found that, as long as people are not explicitly told that they
are paid, they consider themselves to be in one of the three non-money market
settings and their outlook on what they should do is different. Experiments with
students show that not offering a payment often results in greater efforts than when
money is proffered, especially when it concerns tasks like ‘helping out’ such as
carrying a sofa upstairs. When money is offered, cost–beneﬁt thinking is used as
people seek to match their effort to the rate of pay. High pay means more effort in
solving simple tasks but low or even medium rates of pay mean less effort than no
pay. Experiment results suggest that monetary incentives can have signiﬁcant
effects on how tasks are framed and therefore the motivation with which we engage
in them. When no payment is mentioned, or when it is offered in the form of gifts,
effort seems to stem from altruistic motives and the exchange is viewed as a social
one (Heyman/Ariely 2004: 792).
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Yet, the marketized and commodiﬁed way we live today makes cost–beneﬁt
thinking almost unavoidable. Diener et al. tentatively hint that societies could feel
very different if economic indicators were not constantly present, but instead
replaced with information on how many spent time with their family, did a good
turn for their neighbor, exercised or engaged in meditation and prayer (Diener et al.
2009: 40).
In Sect. 3.3 I will discuss the role of price signals as guiding indicators in more
detail. Here I want to conclude with a summary of what psychology, sociology and
neurosciences tell us about the genesis, power and changeability of mental path
dependencies. It shows that the methodological stunt of making Homo economicus
the representative agent for all of humanity is scientiﬁcally false. In the light of this
fact, merely containing criticism by tinkering around the edges is insufﬁcient. The
sociologist Welzer ridicules the way that mainstream models have started to tinker
by, for example, varying exogenous preferences: some green values are brought in
but the main impetus of wanting more remains the constant hypothesis of the theory
from which everything is deduced. Would I now rather have two funky bikes
instead of one car? In this paradigm, people’s core motivations cannot change. Yet,
historical studies show they can. The concept of psychogenesis, for example,
encompasses changes in endogenous preferences (do I really want to have all this
stuff?). This is simply excluded from mainstream economic frameworks even
though sociology suggests no less than that “changes in social structure lead to the
emergence of new social forms and practices, and thus to psychologically different
people with different needs” (Welzer 2011: 15).
3.1.5 Summary: Human Need Perception and Well-Being
Depend on the Processes Behind Creating Wealth
The research I have presented above renders obsolete the mainstream concepts
summarized in Table 3.1 and used to understand human needs and their satisfac-
tion. Human needs are not endless (although maybe the ‘wants’ created by
advertising are) and utility or happiness are much more than fleeting sensations of
joy and excitement experienced after consuming new things. After securing
material needs for subsistence, the most important factors for happiness and
well-being are not the absolute amount of income but income security. The other
important aspect is the match between income or available money and the costs of
having access to the need-satisfaction strategies one deems necessary for
well-being. This quantitative ratio depends on the context in which the person
happens to live and is usually corrected for by purchasing power estimates. These
do not capture qualitative differences between offers of similar services, like public
versus private health care or education. The bigger the qualitative gaps the less well
people feel if they cannot afford access to private services. Also, the more explicit
consumerist culture is advertised and declared to be normal, the more important
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conspicuous consumption becomes—and the money needed to participate in it.
Anecdotal evidence in Germany has it that richer people drive Porsche but buy their
groceries at the cheapest discount stores. So once we dig deeper, we ﬁnd that
happiness is an existential feeling of being on top of one’s life and its challenges.
Neither the utility of a product nor the happiness of a person can be measured by the
price people are willing to pay for something. Yet, constantly calculating costs and
beneﬁts and guiding one’s life by comparing numbers as expressions of value
makes people lose their senses of worthiness, connection and caring.
So why should we continue to build societal development paths around the idea
that constant accumulation is always beneﬁcial to people or society as a whole?
Well-being research helps bring to light the underlying needs that market-based
consumption is actually serving and how many different options a society has to
satisfy them. By debunking the consumption–happiness–maximization law we can
thus become creative in ﬁnding solutions for improved utility that align with Earth’s
ecosystems and other people’s needs for social relations, meaningful engagement
and respect. It becomes possible to imagine reduced production and consumption
levels without panicky reactions or unfounded excuses that doing so would nec-
essarily decrease happiness, well-being and freedom.
This requires and enables system innovation processes that focus on unlocking
political, economic and sociocultural path dependencies that were created to serve
the stark utopia of endless gain through a market system. Thinking back to Fig. 2.5
on the materiality of ideas, we can see that creating processes with such vision and
beliefs in mind resulted in a system that had the growth imperative wired into its
functioning. This is of course the second part of Jackson’s Growth Dilemma: that
any ‘degrowth’ undertaken today—given current institutional setups—is unstable
and causes unemployment and recession. I would add the breakdown of the
ﬁnancial markets. Without a doubt, instant degrowth would diminish the happiness
of many. But it is the result of a structural crisis and not of the violation of some
natural laws of human existence. Twenty-ﬁrst century empirical research shows that
those do not exist.
In this the qualitative survey data of well-being research and the historical
observations of ﬁgurative sociology receive supporting evidence from natural sci-
ences. Brain researchers have observed how our experiences of the external world
and our judgments of them ﬁnd expression in the development of our neuronal
architecture. So quite literally, external circumstances, in their appearances as
social, cultural, technological and economic institutions, design our internal
infrastructure. These wirings determine how we experience and judge events now
and in the future.
“What happens in your mind changes your brain, both temporarily and in lasting
ways; neurons that ﬁre together wire together. And what happens in your brain
changes your mind, since the brain and mind are a single, integrated system” write
Rick Hanson and Richard Mendius, cofounders of the Wellspring Institute for
Neuroscience and Contemplative Wisdom (Hanson 2009: 18). And the brain
changes through training just as muscles do. Hanson and Mendius quote Francisco
Varela, the famous Chilean biologist and neuroscientist, when describing this
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mutually reinforcing relationship: “In the largest sense, your mind is made by your
brain, body, natural world, and human culture—as well as by the mind itself”
(Hanson 2009: 7).
These ﬁndings resonate with Welzer’s ‘mental infrastructures’ that have path
dependency effects embedded beneath cognitive processes of knowing or social fears
of losing status or access. Referring to the economic growth paradigm, Welzer dis-
cusses how deeply rooted resistance to change can therefore be. Debunking it would
play on people’s fundamental “secret fears” that “everything they have established,
everything they worked for, planned and believed in, could have been meaningless.
The dimensions of meaning and identity that Western-style capitalist societies pro-
vide stand and fall with the functioning of the market” (Welzer 2011: 29).
So of course post-growth imaginaries and narratives may not necessarily gain
traction right away. They may offer the least enticements to those who risk losing
quite a few of their privileges if the promise of always more for everyone cedes and
paradigms and narratives on fair shares become dominant.
I am not sure if this was the upset of the human self-image that the Brundtland
Report foresaw to be necessary for sustainability to succeed. But surely, scientiﬁc
concepts and models should help to understand and explain such an upset and its
consequences instead of ruling it out by imposing theoretical iron cages.
The evidence behind policymaking would then look very different as well.
Richard Layard, leading British happiness economist, argues that well-being
research ﬁndings require turning mainstream concepts of productivity and com-
petitiveness on their head. Given the hedonic treadmill and high price of materi-
alism, he demands that policy should constrain the ability of individuals to earn and
work much more than other people:
If a person works harder and earns more, he may himself gain by increasing his income
compared with other people. But the other people lose because their income now falls
relative to his. He does not care that he is polluting other people in this way, so we must
provide him with an incentive to do so (Layard 2005: 229).
The proposed incentive is signiﬁcantly higher taxation on working too much
given that a true beneﬁt to society as a whole can no longer be identiﬁed. Whether
or not one likes this particular proposal, the important idea is that the adoption of a
historically sensitive mind-set does not lend itself to there-is-no-alternative claims.
Sociocultural circumstances and politico-economic institutions like markets shape
people’s mind-sets and imaginary and therefore their aspirations and preferred
need-satisfaction strategies. In the light of their surveys, for example, Kahneman
and Krueger suggest shifting attention from increasing consumption opportunities
to an emphasis on increasing social contacts; shifting the emphasis from income for
well-being toward a person’s relative embedding in society; making possible a
different allocation of time that reduces the amount of time people spend doing
things they ﬁnd unpleasant (Kahneman/Krueger 2006: 18).
Given that work in its current forms ranks high among those things in life which
many say they do not like doing, some interesting strategies for sustainability
emerge. A popular one is to reduce working hours, because this would allow for the
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wider sharing of paid work available, thus reducing unemployment—which is even
worse for health and well-being. This said, one also wants to include an analysis of if
or how this reduces pay and what it does to purchasing power and thus access in
deeply marketized societies. In Great Britain, for example, where private debt is the
highest in Europe and many low-paid workers have mortgages to service, the pro-
spect of earning less in exchange for having more time does not mean an improved
life. Unlocking path dependencies in complex settings require whole system change
strategies with policy-packages hedging such detrimental side-effects.
Another approach could be to change the experienced utility itself, so that
spending time at work was less of a nuisance. For this to happen, the idea of what
makes a ﬁrm competitive would need to change. Its prime benchmarking purpose
would become delivering high product and process utility in the most resource-light
and resilient way—instead of myopic and narrow price competitiveness. It would
include outcomes of social capital (good relationships, reported well-being, and
trust), human capital (giving people skills, their ability to creatively innovate and
collaborate), and the protection of environmental capital (as little resource use as
possible for the delivery of certain need satisﬁers). Some corporate strategies do
involve such ideas, but usually not as the goals of their system: they are means to
better deliver on the unchanged goal of maximum proﬁt.
To level the benchmarking playing ﬁeld for those companies that sincerely try to
turn these means into goals, regulatory changes are necessary. These goals could
also free corporations from the pilot paralysis they report regarding their sustain-
ability endeavors. This would, however, require changing their business model and
thus corporate charters themselves. Other measures like taxation or subsidies are of
course political incentives that still induce people to work harder. In a transfor-
mational agenda the holy cow of constantly striving for labor productivity increases
should have to justify its merit: “if tax-cutters think people should work still harder,
they need to explain why” (Layard 2005: 228).
Today’s standard measures and indicators emerged from the ideas about the
world held by their inventors. Stripped of this context they function like ‘objective’
reference frameworks in arguing how to do things adequately. So if our culture,
signals and symbols were transformative in a way that steered clear of materialistic
values, extrinsic incentives and monetized expressions of worth, the perceived need
for ever more gain or new stuff in materially saturated societies might well fall. The
other deep wiring that needs double-checking is of course that of endless compe-
tition and individualist comparisons to deﬁne one’s own worth and value.
Interestingly, with these observations we come close to Asian wisdom that has
conceived of happiness as an existential and social concept all along. It stands for a
way of leading a life that is content overall and in which you feel able to master
challenges and enjoy what you are given. In Buddhist ethics and philosophy, as the
Bhutanese example of Gross National Happiness or GNH will show in Chapter 4 a
high degree of well-being for some individuals does not count as an achievement if
others in the community are suffering at lower levels. The Greek term eudaimonia,
as used by Aristotle, has a similar meaning. It describes happiness as an activity
rather than an emotional state: Happy individuals are capable of living up to the
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potentials of human nature and this leads to virtuous engagement for the common
good. For a comprehensive overview of different deﬁnitions of happiness see the
crowd-sourced Wikipedia.
So, sometimes it feels as though innovation is not always about ﬁnding new
ideas and evidence but also about remembering old wisdom. After all, if thought
through to its logical conclusion, the stark utopia and grand narrative of endless
gain is a desperate one. There is no happy ending if humans can simply never get
enough. As the numbers cited have shown, the threshold of what people report they
need to feel good keeps on growing with the wealth of society as a whole. In this
development vision we can never reach satisfaction. Thus, a culture and society
nested in mind-sets and institutions of endless economic growth and competition
appears less a stark utopia of freedom of choice and happiness, and more a dystopia
of never being able to enjoy and relax.
3.2 How Mainstream Economics Views Nature and Its
Governance
The second light green column of Table 3.1 assembles central concepts that
mainstream economics applies when dealing with nature: forests, oceans, moun-
tains, ﬁelds, deserts and the animals living in those locations. It provides the ana-
lytical tools available when addressing the second of the Brundtland Report’s key
qualiﬁers of sustainable development. That is “the idea of limitations imposed by
the state of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet
present and future needs” (WCED 1987: 41). This is relevant for current genera-
tions and for safeguarding the livelihoods and well-being of future generations, and
the way the issue is phrased is very important. The message is usually framed
wrongly. In line with key thinkers during the Enlightenment movement (most
prominently Thomas Malthus), nature is depicted as imposing limits on human
development, of which there seems to be only one right, linear version.
However, by using instead the relational complex systems view that natural
sciences offer in the twenty-ﬁrst century, we see that it is the manner and degree of
human interference with nature’s ability to reproduce its wealth that is backﬁring. If
we change our ideas and goals of development or progress, our choice of tech-
nology and social organization, humans and nature can both flourish over the long
run. And from a less anthropocentric point of view, flourishing nature is an ethical
goal in itself, totally independent of the use value that this provides for humans.
The Second Enlightenment mindshift replaces the lens of ‘ﬁghting nature’s
limits by extracting more natural resources faster’ with one of ‘aligning production
and consumption patterns with her circular reproductive cycles.’ This requires
descriptions, measures and models that illuminate where and how human inter-
ference hampers ecological laws.
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As we can see from the production function in Fig. 3.1, non-production-related
environmental beneﬁts or waste impacts on nature do not ﬁgure in mainstream
thought unless producers need to pay a price for them. This way it is only viewed as
a ﬁctitious commodity, an input factor whose price producers will try to lower in
order to stay competitive. The best mechanism to counter this trend and govern
scarce resources is to ‘get the prices right’ so that markets avoid exhausting
resources. With increasing scarcity, they become more expensive and therefore
unattractive for continued use, hence an alternative will be found. Nature is thus not
viewed as a web of life but as a heap of resources whose chunks have different
exchange values (prices), depending on their scarcity. Degradation does not matter
as long as alternative resources or technologies can ﬁll the spot in production
chains.
The solution to this problem requires more than merely grouping input factors
into social, human, manufactured, and natural capital. As long as the models freely
exchange one type of capital for another in doing the math on successful devel-
opment, we see nothing of the real world changes underneath. On the input side the
models track flows of single chunks of nature (e.g., cubic meters of wood) but are
blind to the laws of their reproduction, which would help identify how, or which,
important resources are renewed at what rate (how quickly does a forest grow and
which soils are necessary for that?) and which stocks are indeed limited and
therefore need careful exploitation if long-term use is necessary. Regarding the
output side, superﬁcial exchange value (market prices) says nothing about the actual
use values (need satisﬁers) that were generated. Growing output in the ﬁnancial
sector, for example, counts as positive growth in GDP standards even if it results
from speculative gains on staple food commodities that make the prices of these
prohibitively high for hungry people. From this point of view there is nothing
beyond the economic sphere and everything within it can be converted into
everything else—and nothing really gets lost. Everything is either capital as
expressed in market prices or invisible.
This is why economists like Daly have argued for the introduction of
non-monetized benchmarks, warning of “uneconomic growth” in which monetized
indicators like GDP still show growth even though the use value (utility) created for
humans becomes negative and/or natural capital stocks are destroyed beyond
recovery rate. The following sections will pick up on these aspects by zooming in
on each of the key concepts captured in Table 3.1 that refer to governing nature.
3.2.1 What Types of Capital Exist and Where Do They
Come from?
As in Sect. 3.1, I would like to start this discussion by presenting the typical
mainstream economic model that students are shown when studying macroeco-
nomic dynamics. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 highlight the blind spots when thinking about
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production processes and here we turn to the model of an entire economic system. It
consists of two main actor groups, producers or ﬁrms and consumers or households.
The resulting image is that of a circular flow of goods and services and factors of
production (labor, land and capital) in a closed loop, guided by price signals
(Fig. 3.3).
In his discussion of how complexity economics diverges from this paradigm,
Beinhocker returned to his “half-baked physics” analogy, which rests on the First
Law of Thermodynamics, also called the Conservation of Energy Principle. It was
developed in the late eighteenth century and explains that in isolated or closed
systems energy is neither created nor destroyed but merely changes its forms. You
always have the same total: if net energy or heat is supplied to a system it equals the
net work done by the system. Energy in economics is capital. Similar to utility it
needs some measurement unit and this is once again money. The value of pieces of
capital is expressed in market prices, so what counts is their “exchange value.”
The Second Law of Thermodynamics followed midway through the nineteenth
century and refers to the irreversibility of natural processes. It states that every time
energy changes its form there is an increase in entropy, a measure of disorder or
randomness. This means that continued activity will eventually make any closed or
isolated system decay into disorder. Only open systems, using energy and matter
Fig. 3.3 Mainstream economics model of the economy. Source Daly/Farley (2010: 25)
82 3 Why the Mainstream Economic Paradigm Cannot Inform …
flowing through, can counter this process. They can create syntropy—order,
structure and patterns—by taking the necessary energy from connected systems.
This is how nature uses the sun’s energy for its evolutionary reproduction circuits—
and how humans use nature.
Yet, this fully baked physics did not make it into mainstream economic models.
The sources of energy remain invisible in mainstream economic models. Only the
prices of what is exchanged are tracked. In their classic textbook Ecological
Economics: Principles and Applications (2010) famous ecological economists
Herman Daly and Joshua Farley summarize the loss of information so brilliantly
that it is worth quoting at length:
What is it that is really flowing around and around in a circle in the circular flow vision? Is
it really physical goods and services, and physical laborers and land and resources? No. It is
only abstract exchange value, the purchasing power represented by these physical things.
The ‘soul’ embodied in goods by the ﬁrms is abstract exchange value. When goods arrive at
the households, the ‘soul’ of exchange value jumps out of its embodiment in goods and
takes on the body of factors for its return trip to the ﬁrms, whereupon it jumps out of the
body of factors and reincorporates itself once again into goods, and so on. But what
happens to all the discarded bodies of goods and factors as the soul of exchange value
transmigrates from ﬁrms to households and back ad inﬁnitum? (Daly/Farley 2010: 28)
The real-world impact that the discarded bodies create lies beyond what is
captured by capital accounting. Mines, wells, ﬁshing grounds or cropland are built
up and replenished according to their own logics. They are not simply available
because someone demands them and is willing to pay a price. Nor are their
capacities to absorb and store all the discarded bodies endless.
One estimate puts the total amount of extracted raw materials that end up as solid
waste at 12 billion tons per year, of which 4 billion tons are generated in OECD
countries alone (OECD 2014b: 10). The only way that such waste enters the
exchange value circle is in form of the cost of collecting it and storing it some-
where. What remains unaccounted for is how nature then deals with this output,
which might include gigantic garbage dumps, sealed radioactive containers, or a
ﬁeld of plastic the size of Texas floating in the Paciﬁc Ocean. Even more difﬁcult to
account for, in particular in price signals, is non-material waste like emissions from
burning fossil fuels, the declining fertility of billions of hectares of soil, the seepage
of chemicals from agriculture into the earth and then into the oceans, destroying
coral reefs.
The ﬁrst UN World Conference on Sustainable Development in 1992 in Rio de
Janeiro acknowledged that the management of ecosystems might need different
governance mechanisms than that of conventional markets. Thus, Rio created
conventions for tackling climate change, biodiversity loss and desertiﬁcation. Still,
economic growth impacts are always of concern and already in the 1970s econo-
mists had engaged with nature by making it an input factor of production functions.
Somewhat as all the pleasure (output) to be had was stuffed into the abstract
container term of utility, 1970s economists simply expanded the term ‘capital’ to
include everything that could be used productively (input). Both are handily
measured in monetary terms, so that predictive models can be run.
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US economists Robert Solow and John Hartwick then embarked on the question
of the intergenerational allocation of natural resources and their basic idea became
that of ‘capital substitutability.’ In line with closed system exchange value con-
version assumptions, capital substitutability holds that while each generation should
have the same amount of capital available, the composition of its overall stock can
vary. For example, natural capital can be degraded as long as man-made capital is
increased to the same value (Solow 1986: 141–149).
When the Rio Summit put intergenerational distribution of the means for need
satisfaction center stage, this concept was included in the measures recommended
for tracking if development had become sustainable. But instead of making cal-
culations according to the biophysical laws of nature, policymakers used the laws of
exchange value for natural assets. Capital substitutability offered a way to integrate
the environment with economic calculations that need not upset the human
self-image: economic growth could happily continue. It might also have helped that
Robert Solow won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1987, the same year that the
Brundtland Report came out.
Natural scientists and ecological economists were and are critical of this move
and demand that there should be limits to the use of market pricing in a good
governance regime. Let us explore their criticisms and alternative concepts in more
detail.
3.2.2 Market Prices and the Allocation or Protection
of Scarce Resources
The term that mainstream economics uses when its models’ predictions go awry is
‘market failure.’ There is no question as to whether markets are always the best
solution; the problem is always that some policymaker was silly enough to inter-
vene in the equilibrating checks and balances of exchange value. Of course there
are many, many cases where market prices are distorted, often because private
actors also seek to manipulate them. The aim of making them tell the ‘truth’ about
the environmental and social costs involved in producing a product or service is a
necessary one. But it is not sufﬁcient to govern human–nature relations in a sus-
tainable manner.
Here are some examples in which prices did not secure good allocation or
prevent overexploitation of nature’s riches. First, when the natural resources
affected are needed for subsistence. The direct survival means of many of the
poorest people in the world today need to be protected against price hikes fuelled by
speculative interests that aggravate supply crises. Individual economic gain aspi-
rations need to yield to survival needs. Yet, if there is a detectable pattern, it seems
to be that instead of prioritizing the needs of the poor, exchange value orientation
means prioritizing the rich with purchasing power. Second, and as a consequence of
unequal wealth generation, market prices do not necessarily deter rich people from
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consuming things that prices indicate have become scarce. In a materialist culture of
competitive status-seeking, paying more means showing off—as the term ‘con-
spicuous consumption’ implies.
One example of this is the threatened Japanese blueﬁn tuna, whose very high
price has not reduced consumption, but actually made it even more desirable.
Indeed, in 2013 the ﬁrst tuna of the year was sold for almost $2 million. This pretty
irrational market failure was described as ‘Sushinomics’ by the The Atlantic (Narula
2014). It bears out Daly and Farley’s observation that the maximum economically
and technologically feasible exploitation of nature might just be too high. Even
from a blatantly anthropocentric point of view, this will have disutility effects on all
the manufactured goods whose successful use is dependent on an intact environ-
ment, for example, diving masks worn to observe tuna. Nature, Daly and Farley
note, “provides a complementary service without which the utilities of most con-
sumer goods are not very great” (Daly/Farley 2010: 163).
Worse, there are no price signals for all non-commodiﬁable ecosystem services.
These include the entire cyclical management of freshwater or a healthy atmosphere
in which multiple ecosystems like rivers, oceans, soils and forests are involved in
cleaning water and air so that they are ﬁt for human consumption. Emission trading
schemes represent attempts to create markets for the waste absorbing or usefully
transforming sinks that form part of these ecosystems. In these schemes, producers
are supposed to buy CO2 emission rights (e.g., the European Emissions Trading
System), or the owners of forests are compensated for the CO2 extracted from the
atmosphere (e.g., the REDD+ mechanism under the UN Framework Convention for
Climate Change). The goal is to disincentivize both the use of CO2-emitting
resources and the destruction of CO2-absorbing ones so that the balance, or carrying
capacity of the atmosphere, can be restored.
However, the creation of markets for ecosystem services only works on single
atomized units of capital, like a ton of CO2, and thus tells us little about the whole
web of natural life. Living species interact and form complex ecosystems with
balancing feedback loops and food chains. Thus, overexploiting one type of
resource, or condemning one species to extinction may seem harmless. But without
an understanding of these intricate relationships, we may create a ‘missing link,’
glut or shortage in the dynamic reproduction circuits of basic life support systems
like water supply, pollination patterns or soil fertility (Daly/Farley 2010: 75–76).
To me, it sounds like a rational risk management strategy to amend these price
signals with some biophysical data tracking and sound regulations on usage limits.
This is particularly important given the minimal help that price signals can provide
for future-oriented precautionary governance of scarce resources: living complex
systems are unpredictable precisely because these development models are built
around a mechanical additive understanding in which single elements can be freely
subtracted and added without changing the overall dynamic. The Assessment
Reports of the IPCC, for example, calculate that, if the atmosphere is to stay within
its current dynamic equilibrium, a concentration of CO2 somewhere between 350
and 450 ppm is all that the natural cycle of CO2 transformation can take. If we
exceed this amount, all the ecosystems involved in the carbon cycle face changes
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and potentially drastic ones, such as ocean acidiﬁcation, sea level rise, increased
flooding or, by contrast, desertiﬁcation, and so on.
Meanwhile, the challenge with complex systems is that they often have delays in
their feedback structures, depending on the available stocks of resources that can be
used, like credit, for a certain amount of time. In addition, the effects on one
resource or biophysical process are typically linked with other natural cycles and
may lead to accelerated feedback loops that have nothing to do with the original
human activities. This means that problems often only become visible or tangible
when it is no longer easy to put a halt to the damage they are causing. The linear
causality image of a kettle removed from a stove when it whistles is utterly mis-
leading. MIT professor John Sterman and Harvard education expert Linda
Booth-Sweeney explain this “wrong mental model” in the context of climate
change. It assumes, they argue, that it will only
require short delays in all the links in a long causal chain, stretching from the detection of
adverse climate impacts to the decision to implement mitigation policies to emissions
reductions to changes in atmospheric GHG [Greenhouse Gas] concentrations to radiative
forcing to surface warming and ﬁnally to climate impacts, including changes in ice cover,
sea level, weather patterns, agricultural productivity, the distribution of species, extinction
rates, and the incidence of diseases, among others. None of these conditions hold: there are
long delays in every link of the chain (Sterman/Sweeney 2007: 214).
None of this can be captured by exchange value or market prices. The gover-
nance of nature requires multidimensional evidence instead of the typical monetized
cost–beneﬁt analyses that are popular in policymaking. In those natural protection
measures, investment in education, extent of social welfare, etc., are judged by
quantifying their value in monetary terms. Equipped with those numbers one can
calculate when it is ‘economic’ to implement them. There are no general standards
as to how this conversion should be done, so it is down to the ethical judgments and
mind-set of the—often economics-trained—policy advisor: what is the monetary
value of a human life? How much should saving thousands of lives a year through
tougher pollution standards therefore be allowed to cost? When is it too expensive?
Whose competitiveness might be impacted by the higher costs of production?
When it comes to presenting the ‘evidence,’ numerical equations radiate the aura
of objectivity. But digging into what twenty-ﬁrst century science tells us about
nature renders equations unsuitable for sound economic governance. Ecological
economists like Daly therefore demand a precautionary approach that starts from
the premise that certain functions of nature—some of its laws—cannot be dupli-
cated by humans but are essential to the continuation of human prosperity on this
planet, at least for the foreseeable future. They determine the quantity of and rate at
which nature develops the low entropy resources that humans use. For example, the
humus in fertile soil that takes up to 2000 years to form, and the fossil fuels that
started forming 300 to 400 million year ago. Likewise the way that high entropy
waste in the form of emissions, chemicals and heat can be absorbed by plants, soil,
water, and so on.
Sustainability economics will need to embed the exchange value loop model in
the real world, argues Daly. During his time from 1988 to 1994 as a senior
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economist at the World Bank he developed a succinct set of management principles
for sustainability. They show which scientiﬁc and ethical judgments are inherent in
market prices and cost–beneﬁt analyses:
• The use rate of renewable resources cannot be higher than their rate of regen-
eration or they are lost for future generations.
• The use of non-renewable natural resources should not exceed the discovery of
alternative sources to deliver on the same function (e.g., replacing fossil fuels
with solar technology).
• Emissions cannot be higher than the capacity of the natural environment to cope
with them.
• Human-made threats to or excessive risks for human health and the environment
should be avoided (Wikipedia 2014).
So even if one sticks with the mainstream lens of rejecting allocation decisions
through laws and agreements, the question about when prices tell the environmental
and social truth will be equally political. This process cannot be left to economist
modelers. In democracies the process needs to be as explicit and transparent as
possible. The agenda on Planetary Boundaries, or limits to growth, is about nothing
else, even though its critics like to portray it as doomsday eco-dictatorship. No one
is talking about people not being allowed to intervene in nature, intentionally
enhance natural resources or look for artiﬁcial ones. It is about developing a good
understanding of what we have and how the laws of resource reproduction coalesce
so that we can manage development processes well and equitably.
This view has also been dubbed “strong sustainability” and its advocates argue
that the three dimensions—social, ecological, economic—of sustainable develop-
ment should capture its paradigmatic shift away from the old development imagi-
nary. Sustainable development should not be delineated with three pillars of similar
importance—the dominant icon since the Earth Summit in 1992—it should instead
be portrayed as a series of embedded systems. Figure 3.4 shows that this renders the
economic system—the stark utopia of the market system—the servant rather than
the master of the social and environmental system. A discussion of the arguments
can be found in the ﬁrst Global Sustainable Development Report (2014).
In line with this paradigm, ecological economists are less interested in what
might theoretically, at some point in the future, be possible if technological revo-
lutions and yet more money were available. They are more interested in preventing
the irreversible harm caused by ignoring the long period of transition required
between now and then. It is from this perspective—also a great mindshift—that
they argue for future development paths that will host a steady state economy that
remains constant instead of exponentially expanding levels of production and
consumption. Getting there would require massive transformations of many path
dependencies in the economic and also social systems. But ruling them out means
accepting massive transformations in the ecological and social systems, which will
also impact economic systems in the mid-term.
3.2 How Mainstream Economics Views Nature and Its Governance 87
Maintaining an unequivocal imaginary and narrative of endless growth might be
politically easier and convenient for privileged groups but cannot be backed by
evidence drawn from the natural sciences of the twenty-ﬁrst century.
3.2.3 Checking Nature’s Safe Operating Spaces for Human
Growth Aspirations
The third and fourth rows in Table 3.1 bring us to a deeper understanding of why
only economists can argue for unlimited growth. The most popular argument we
hear is that one can decouple economic growth from natural resource use. Make
more with less. There is nothing to say against the efﬁcient and sparing use of
natural resources, but relative savings should not be confused with an absolute
reduction of human-caused exploitation levels. Raw material extraction levels
reached 70 billion tons in 2008. This is unprecedented not only in total but also in
the amount per person: about 10.5 tons. Of course these numbers vary widely
between countries, being lower in India and China and higher in Australia and Chile
(Wiedmann et al. 2015: 6273–75). So it seems like good news that global average
resource intensity or relative decoupling as measured in the standard indicator of
Domestic Material Consumption per unit of GDP (DMC/GDP) has decreased
signiﬁcantly from 3.6 kg/$ in 1900 to 1.3 kg/$ in 2005 (Wiedmann et al. 2015:
6271). Otherwise the world would look like a big mine shaft. With this indicator, as
OECD reports summarize, it also looks like some countries such as Canada,
Germany, Italy and Japan have decoupled DMC from economic growth in absolute
terms. They get richer but no longer need more natural resources.
Yet, a discussion of the rebound effect hinted that current consumption and
market patterns do give price signals that suggest using fewer resources per product
Fig. 3.4 The three-pillar versus embedded-system view of sustainable development. Source Own
illustration
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or service (as long as there are prices on the natural resources or waste created) but
don’t really suggest using fewer resources in total. ‘Making more’ and ‘consuming
more’ remain the dominant partners in the formula.
One study that tried to untangle what seem to be contradicting observations was
undertaken by an international group of ecological economists working with
Thomas Wiedmann and published as ‘The material footprint of nations’ in the
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the US (PNAS). They show
that DMC, despite being the lead indicator for the Green Growth and Green
Economy studies and strategies of the EU, OECD and also the UN Environment
Programme (UNEP), hosts two big blind spots:
(1) it captures only those materials that made it into the ﬁnal products and leaves
all the waste and extraction created in the process unaccounted for;
(2) it allocates the resource extraction ﬁgures in the country where they occur and
not in the countries where the products they are used for are consumed.
This means that all the environmental impacts associated with extracting and
processing raw materials into goods fall out of the picture. These include water
resource depletion and pollution, soil erosion, biodiversity loss, mine tailings, and
natural destruction or pollution through spillages and agrochemicals. In particular
the production of metals involves digging out ores and turning them into concen-
trated commodities. It also means the obfuscation of the way in which the glob-
alized supply chains rich countries use to primarily import materials or even
semi-ﬁnished products relegate consumption and natural impact to two separate
balance sheets (Wiedmann et al. 2015: 6273). This ‘leakage’ effect has already been
criticized in connection with the commonly used statistics and thus negotiations
about CO2 reduction commitments.
To tackle these blind spots the research team used the Material Footprint
(MF) as a consumption rather than production indicator. It measures all the natural
impact that a particular economy creates, including unused extraction, and
regardless of where resources happen to be taken out. The indicator has also been
called Total Material Requirement (TMR) and comparing it with DMC shows a
“process of externalization of resource-intensive processes of mature economies” in
which the MF per capita becomes considerably larger than the standard measure
(ibid.: 6273). The United Kingdom and Japan are at the extreme end not only
regarding this statistical aberration but also in their dependence on imports for their
levels of ﬁnal consumption.
When checking for correlations with factors that influence the levels of MF—
such as availability of raw materials, density of population or GDP per capita—the
ﬁndings conﬁrm “a very strong link found previously between growth in building
materials, ores, and fossil fuels use and economic growth in most of developing
Asia, most notably in China,” and, as in many other studies working with footprint
indicators, with levels of income. For “a 10 % increase in wealth, the MF would
increase by 6 %” (Wiedmann et al. 2015: 6273).
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So while it is commonly argued that environmental pollution drops once certain
thresholds of income are reached (the famous Kuznet’s curve) this cannot be
documented in such meta studies. Instead they bring to the fore structural questions
that will become vital in the SDG agenda, e.g., which development model can claim
to be sustainable? Surely not those whose MFs overshoot what would be a fair
share of the globally available resources by a factor of ﬁve to ten?
This is what Stefan Bringezu, member of the UNEP International Resource
Panel, found when undertaking a per-capita calculation of fair shares of all natural
resources. A “potential sustainability corridor” would be reached by 2050 if the
Total Material Consumption (TMC) of abiotic or non-renewable resources lay
between 6 and 12 tons per person, the TMC of biotic or renewable resources below
2 tons per person, and the Raw Material Consumption (RMC) of used biotic and
abiotic materials between 3 and 6 tons per person. He concludes that “[F]or policy,
a ‘10-2-5 target triplet’ can provide orientation, when the three indicators are
assigned values of 10, 2, and 5 t/person, respectively” (Bringezu 2015: 25). To put
these numbers into perspective: for rich countries they mean a reduction of 40–
90 % in each of the indicators based on 2014 use levels (ibid.: 42–45).
We see that before decoupling strategies can be called successful, their calcu-
lations and indicators need to tell the true story behind any Green Growth path,
especially for a global agenda. The OECD as well as the EU have come around to
expressing the limitations of DMC but have not accepted absolute targets for TMR
as Bringezu suggests.
But why are natural scientists so concerned with deﬁning a sustainability cor-
ridor or operating space? Because market prices can only tell the truth about social
and environmental impact when these are realistically estimated. If an estimate is
undertaken with a mechanical engineering mind-set it will look very different from
one undertaken with an embedded systems view. According to the latter, ecosys-
tems already risk losing the stable and resilient environmental characteristics to
which humanity is accustomed. This is what the term ‘Anthropocene’ stands for:
the 10,000 benign years of the Holocene have been ended by human interference
with Earth’s reproductive processes. This earth system science shows us that if we
extract from the planet all that is technologically and economically feasible to
harvest, it will be far too much for the planet to sustain. Price signals come too late
unless caps for maximum exploitation are deﬁned.
The research agenda on ‘Planetary Boundaries’ aims to avoid ecosystem cycles
or reproduction being ‘tipped out’ of dynamic equilibrium. Twenty-six scientists
published an article on Planetary Boundaries in the journal Nature in 2009 to
highlight the fact that three out of nine central dimensions of Earth’s productive
processes were already in a state of overexploitation: namely CO2 and nitrogen
cycles, and the rate of biodiversity loss (Rockström et al. 2009). The title dovetails
well with the mainstream image of nature limiting human growth aspirations. Yet,
the article is a plea to understand these boundaries and to align human activity with
them. This is what the subtitle “A Safe Operating Space for Humanity” means
(Table 3.3).
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The concept of Planetary Boundaries was developed to host an ongoing process
of reﬁnement in line with improving data and computer simulations (see, for
example, Steffen et al. 2015). The work includes the identiﬁcation of the best
indicators for the remaining two of the nine dimensions and to understand regional
thresholds in line with the actual biophysical realities in these areas. Regional
assessments are necessary because, in certain regions, tipping points in some of the
dimensions will be reached much more quickly than in the global average. There
are prime examples in the cases of freshwater provision and soil erosion.
Another research angle addresses the correlations between the dimensions, for
example, of how land-use pattern changes impact on CO2 emissions, freshwater
availability, and biodiversity. This is necessary because otherwise predictive cal-
culations as to how many resources are left for production, or how they can be
substituted by renewable ones may end up relying on one source several times over.
This issue is currently emerging with the growing agenda for a ‘bio-economy.’
Raw material shortages are to be circumvented by using biomass and natural ﬁbers
instead. While the political strategies tend to insist that food production has to have
priority over industrial use, quantiﬁcations on what this means in practice are
missing. The German bio-economy strategy of June 2013, for example, aligns its
goals with those of the German sustainable development strategy that seeks to limit
the conversion of land for settlement, transport, production, or agriculture from 87
to 30 ha daily by 2020. However, this policy fails to provide any safeguards for
maximum conversion limits, if Planetary Boundaries are to remain intact (Destatis
2012: 15). This relative target still allows for an indeﬁnite 10,680 ha to be con-
verted every year after 2020. Over the long run Germany could turn every forest
into a ﬁeld for biomass.
It was research scientists at the UN International Resource Panel that shed some
light onto how much global cropland is actually available to sustainably supply
food for 9–10 billion people. They undertook extensive work to identify where
thresholds lie for land-use changes if biodiversity loss, release of CO2, disruption of
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Their 2014 report, Assessing Global Land Use: Balancing Consumption with
Sustainable Supply, concludes that humanity’s safe operating space ends at a total
of 1640 million hectares of global cropland, which leaves roughly an additional 100
million hectares yet to be converted. Were current trends to continue, this limit
would be reached by 2020 and conversion would not stop there but, as can be seen
in Table 3.4, eat up an additional 320–849 million hectares before demand leveled
off (UNEP 2014: 23–25). To prevent this the report recommends that signiﬁcant
changes in agricultural practices, production and consumption patterns and the
composition of diets are more imperative than the growth of a land-guzzling
bio-economy.
Of course, the ranges calculated for the Planetary Boundaries are contested.
Interestingly, most of the criticism comes from within the strong sustainability
camp and is lodged by biologists or experts in the individual dimensions. They
argue that the identiﬁcation of precise thresholds is still too numerical and too
mechanical, further supporting the persistence of the managerial paradigm of
exploiting nature as quickly and effectively as possible. Others say that global
boundaries cannot tell us much about regional challenges, among which the
availability of land, fresh water or oceans, for example, differ widely.
Another caveat concerns the absence of non-renewable resources in what has
become the most prominent framework in addressing the sustainable governance of
nature. As the discussion on the MF showed, this omission obscures much of the
picture of how much natural capital is left. It also showed that even if the boundary
or carrying capacity numbers are not totally correct, the trends toward overex-
ploitation are so clearly documented that swiftly and signiﬁcantly changing course
should be the rational strategy.
One crucial element in this context is indeed the much more efﬁcient use of
natural resources, the improvement of recycling rates, adoption of modular designs
and a choice of materials that allows for reintegration into the natural cycles.










Food supply 71 300 Based on Bruinsma (2009),
RFA (2008), Bringezu et al. (2009a)
Biofuel supply 48 80 Based on Fischer (2009), IEA (2011)
Biomaterial supply 4 115 Based on Colwill et al. (2001),
Raschka/Carus (2012)
Net expansion 123 495
Compensation for
built environment
107 129 Based on Electris et al. (2009)
Compensation for
soil degradation
90 225 Based on Scherr (1999)
Gross expansion 320 849
Source UNEP (2014: 20)
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Measures and incentives as well as policy frameworks are needed toward this end.
Yet, doing all of this without challenging the output indicator of the decoupling
agenda, GDP, keeps the thinking linearly, geared at maximum possible exploita-
tion: which means, for example, that species extinction rates ten times the average
rate over time are acceptable simply because they would not destroy human
welfare.
3.2.4 How Does Exchange Value Governance Impact
Living Systems?
Just as introducing the logic of cost–beneﬁt thinking in more and more areas of life
numbs people to realizing what is really at stake, the logic of capital substitutability
turns the perceptions of the webs of life of which nature is composed into one of a
demand-satisfying raw material storage whose overexploitation will spur human
ingenuity into ﬁnding substitute input factors. Ironically, the concept was developed
to recognize nature’s importance in economic processes but in the end made nature
invisible.
It was John Hartwick who translated the concept of capital substitutability into
policy guidelines in the 1980s, and after the Rio Summit in 1992 these became the
measurement standards promoted by powerful international institutions. According
to the Hartwick–Solow rule, sustainable development is reached as long as the rent
or beneﬁt made from degrading natural resources is invested in the augmentation of
man-made, i.e., social and human capital (Hartwick 1978: 347–354). As a conse-
quence, the world started changing its accounting systems, incorporating nature into
the most influential measure of economic performance and progress, GDP.
GDP expresses the sum of the market value of all ﬁnal goods and services
produced by ﬁrms, individuals and the government in any given time within one
country’s borders. It is usually calculated annually and, with some minimal
exceptions, nothing is counted that is not purchased within that year. It also pro-
vides the base line for the most common indicator of poverty and standard of living,
GDP per capita. The total of GDP is divided by the number of people living in a
country.
The criticism of GDP as a measure has many nuances but three points are always
made:
• GDP violates accounting rules because it lumps together costs and beneﬁts:
Cleaning up after natural disasters or having to install thick absorption walls
along highways for noise protection create payments for services and products
but are actually defensive expenditures. They only restore or maintain a similar
level of ‘wealth’ but do not increase it.
• GDP ignores all value created or depleted that has not been captured by market
prices. This includes household and volunteer work, education and caring for
children and the aged. Meanwhile, once someone starts being paid for this type
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of work, it automatically registers as ‘growth’ even though nothing new has
been created. Destruction of natural resources like healthy oceans, forests or
landscapes is growth, once someone pays for their raw materials, but the same
destruction is invisible if they do not.
• GDP is blind to the effects of distribution. The overall sum does not show who
has been receiving which amount of income from exchanging the products and
services whose market prices are aggregated. The per capita GDP of a country
may therefore rise while its poverty levels stay the same.
After a ﬁrst wave of debate about the blind spots of GDP as a benchmark for
development in the 1970s, the ever more tangible, negative effects of the economic
growth development agenda have revived criticism in recent years. Since 2007,
many initiatives have formed around the world, which the OECD-led online plat-
form www.wikiprogress.org seeks to keep track of.
Before this revival, however, the capital substitutability logic had elegantly
settled the challenge of environmental limits to progress: in Standard National
Accounting, as used by the UN, only the formation of ﬁxed, produced capital was
counted as an investment in the future, since it is viewed as increasing the value of
the assets available to society. Likewise, depreciation of the value of this type of
capital was calculated as a decrease. The World Bank engaged with the critique of
an undifferentiated understanding of capital and added human and environmental or
natural capital because, according to the World Bank’s Manual for Calculating
Adjusted Net Savings, they are equally important “assets upon which the produc-
tivity and therefore well-being of a nation rest” (World Bank 2002: 4). A depletion
in the stock of an asset like minerals or water means that options for future use
decrease and therefore should be calculated as a disinvestment.
However—and here we ﬁnd the Hartwick-Solow rule—the net opportunity costs
for future citizens are not necessarily negative if the proﬁts made from depletion are
invested elsewhere. The new indicator of Genuine Savings Accounting or Adjusted
Net Savings expresses this substitutability view by subtracting a country’s natural
capital depletion and pollution from its Gross National Income (GNI), which is
similar to GDP but counts the production of all citizens independently of where
they live.
Within the discipline of the economics of sustainability this approach has been
labeled “weak sustainability” because it does not make any reference to the bio-
physical limits that a countrymight well run into even if the entire population becomes
utterly smart and creative. This is different from the safe operating space mind-set and
became the source of peer benchmarking activities comparing the sustainability
performances of different countries. As the World Bank manual explains:
Weak sustainability assumes that any type of capital is perfectly substitutable for
natural capital as an input to production. From the adjusted net savings standpoint,
for example, a nation which reinvested all of its proﬁts from the exploitation of
non-renewable resources in the formation of human capital through its educational
system would have imposed no net opportunity cost on the country’s future
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citizens. Whether or not this is precisely true is a hotly-debated issue, and this study
makes no attempt to settle the issue (World Bank 2002: 4).
In practice this means that an indicator of zero or more is viewed as sustainable
development, whereas negative savings indicate that total net wealth is in decline
and policy change is necessary (ibid.: 5). The most successful role models from this
point of view are all those countries that apply high royalties on the extraction of
their natural resources and use these to improve the social and human capital of
their population, which will then spur further growth.
The 2011 World Bank report, The Changing Wealth of Nations, calculated how
high the “hypothetical produced capital” of several countries would be, had they
reinvested the royalties from their environmental capital accordingly. Trinidad and
Tobago and Gabon could have tripled the social, human, and manufactured capital
they produced between 1995 and 2005 (World Bank 2011: 16). By contrast
Norway and its oil industry is always cited as the exemplary star performer.
So while Adjusted Net Saving acknowledges the growth/environment trade-off
to a certain degree, its assumption of easy capital substitutability does not provide
many warning signals on Planetary Boundaries. Instead it champions development
role models that cannot continue if sustainable development is to be achieved.
Norway is impressively rich in all forms of capital because it possesses and sells a
lot of oil. The IEA predicts that about two-thirds of the oil that could be extracted
and used needs to stay in the ground if climate protection goals are to be reached.
How can a country win the best practice sustainability prize if its current devel-
opment strategy is costing the earth?
Only monetary abstraction allows for the measurement of progress on sustain-
ability while ecosystems are threatening to tip out of balance.
Yet, this translation of all value assets into capital is one of the explicitly
mentioned advantages of the indicator. According to a World Bank manual on
Adjusted Net Saving, “it presents resource and environmental issues within a
framework that ﬁnance and development planning ministries can understand”
(World Bank 2012: 2). But, if the outlooks on the world and the language spoken in
those ministries are not conducive to ﬁnding solutions for sustainability, are they a
good standard to which to convert?
3.2.5 Summary: Governing Human–Nature Relations
Successfully Depends on Understanding Them
Market prices and indeed the economistic way of viewing the world clearly have
their limits when it comes to respecting the environmental and social dimensions of
sustainable development. This is why many scientists have argued for strong sus-
tainability in which different forms of capital cannot simply be exchanged for others
in measures of growth and progress. The clearest expression of this difference in
paradigm is the replacement of the three-pillar image born at the 1992 Rio Summit
96 3 Why the Mainstream Economic Paradigm Cannot Inform …
with one of embedded systems. Three pillars suggest that the economic, social, and
environmental dimensions are of equal quality and could potentially be served in an
additive and not integrated way: some institutions take care of social things, some
protect the environment and others make sure we have enough economic growth.
The total sum would be sustainable development.
I found a striking example of this during my PhD in global political economy
when I was also working as a volunteer campaigner for Friends of the Earth in its
international trade program. Since 1999, international civil society organizations
have formed huge coalitions behind the slogan “Our World is Not for Sale.” They
teamed up with small farmers, ﬁshing communities, and workers from around the
globe to voice concerns about the impact that treating everything as traded com-
modities managed through global market mechanisms has on livelihoods, equity
and ecosystem integrity. They also pointed out that this type of world trade system
would primarily beneﬁt wealthy corporate players who are empowered to expand
their activities according to their own standards.
The dominant narrative found in major global institutions, on the other hand,
presented a mainstream economic spin on why a global trade system and its core
institution, the World Trade Organization (WTO), would beneﬁt poorer people:
growth will trickle down after some structural adjustment periods. Moreover,
environmental issues should be dealt with in the Multilateral Environmental
Agreements (MEAs) but not in purely economic trade negotiations. During my
research into different schools of economic thought and the role that scientiﬁc
expertise plays in institutionalization processes, I came across the following
eye-opening passage from the WTO’s tenth anniversary report. Prepared by an
“international panel of experts” it states: “It is old wisdom in many cultures that you
cannot kill two birds with one stone . . . So the correct policy solution is to ﬁx the
environment through an appropriate environmental policy and to maintain open
trade to maximize the gains from trade and hence economic prosperity” (Sutherland
et al. 2004: 14).
Wow, I thought, have these people not heard anything about the sustainable
development agenda and its argument that this false dichotomy between environ-
ment and economy only holds in theoretical models? Checking the educational
background of the eight experts in question, I found that all of them had studied
economics at American universities. Differing passports notwithstanding, the
degree of diversity of views on this panel could hardly have been lower.
Unsurprisingly, some of the most popular cases for the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body and also the hottest topics in the ongoing Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) negotiations are things like import bans on tuna ﬁshed with
tight nets that create incredible amounts of by-catch, genetically modiﬁed organ-
isms or hormone-treated meats: because they are ‘like products’ (basically offering
the same) they must not be treated differently under the purely economic trade law.
They must be granted equal access to the market. Also prohibited are border tax
adjustments that counter the competitive price advantage of products where
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producers did not pay the ‘true’ price for environmental degradation. One prime
example in the context of climate protection is CO2 emission standards for products
or companies: if only a handful of countries apply them, all foreign competitors
whose home countries do not make them pay for emissions can thus undercut the
more sustainable producers. It takes a degree in mainstream economics to continue
to see environmental and economic concerns as two separate birds and abstracted
‘evidence’ to support such ideological claims in the expert reports. It also takes the
popular growth narrative to justify even criminal pursuit of interests and fraudulent
behavior as somewhat related to overall economic progress.
The Volkswagen scandal is a great demonstration of how an economic mind-set
impacts the framing of events and thus the judgments of what is at stake: the EU
raised its emission standards because it tried to prevent the all-encompassing effects
of climate change and because air quality is the top environmental cause of pre-
mature deaths in Europe—about 100,000 a year. The World Health Organization
(WHO) declared air pollution the single biggest environmental health risk (Vidal
2014). Yet, when the intentional manipulation of emission measurement software
was discovered in Volkswagen cars, it was Volkswagen’s plummeting stock value
and the proﬁt warnings that become headline news. The auto industry stands for
20 % of Germany’s GDP and some headlines are straightforwardly asking if it will
depress the country’s growth. Meanwhile, the German government continued to
block tougher European emission standards in the same month.
Structurally, the Growth Dilemma is real. But in societies with high incomes and
stagnant or negative population levels, the Growth Dilemma resembles far more a
straightjacket than an economy serving human needs: structurally it means we have
to always want more or else our economic systems fall into turmoil. Billions are
expended on marketing so that we do not forget that what we have is not enough.
Before the institutional setup that we are used to calling ‘markets’ can help to
bring out the best innovations and solutions for sustainable societies, they have to
be set up in a way that makes sustainable solutions their goal. Science should help
to understand, untangle and overcome the path dependencies that work in the other
direction. The mainstream economic paradigm and its monetary mind-set, measures
and metrics are not ﬁt for this purpose. They are laden with value judgments and
power relations that disguise instead of enlighten.
3.3 How Mainstream Economics Anticipate the Future
This ﬁnal subchapter turns to the dark green row at the bottom of Table 3.1. It
assesses what adopting the mainstream economic mind-sets means for addressing
the overarching goal of sustainable development: i.e., governing economies so that
future generations can also live satisfactory lives. To begin, mainstream economics
does not so much anticipate the future as extrapolate the way the economy will be
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from the way it was. Or rather, what its models capture of the way the economy
was. Most influential in this respect are the GDP growth predictions derived from
the registered and aggregated monetary transactions. As long as these extrapola-
tions are positive the future looks positive. But if GDP growth is low, ﬁnancial
markets get ‘nervous,’ investors ‘lose trust’ and politicians their jobs.
We have discussed the shortcomings of this measure above but what is important
to add when thinking about the future is that calculating GDP trends is an expo-
nential function. This means that zero growth, often perceived to be an equivalent
to economic standstill, equals operating at the same level of output as before. And
each successive percentage of growth is nominally bigger than the one before: the
baseline is higher. Thus, if GDP increases by, for example, 7 % in poorer countries
it is likely to indicate a far smaller increase in real production output than 1 %
growth in a rich country. Many historically aware experts thus argue that high
growth rates should be anticipated as temporary phenomena and not the norm.
In practice, zero growth does create several problems for the institutions behind
today’s capitalist market societies. But this is the result of the way they are set up
and not some kind of natural inevitability. Much of the data presented above
suggests that positive growth everywhere on the planet is not very likely to continue
much longer. Yet, mainstream economics can by deﬁnition not imagine a positive
future in which societies operate steady-state economies in which the throughput
stays at more or less the same level. The idea of or need for constant growth is a
natural law in any scenario or model for potential policy solutions.
This mental iron cage (Weber) is so strong that arguing for a no-growth or even
degrowth path in rich societies is often conflated with attacking the ethical
imperative of putting the needs of the poorest people ﬁrst. Homo economicus
cannot share existing wealth without flipping his hedonic calculus into the red. The
Brundtland Report found that this would cause too much political resistance: The
matter-of-fact assumption was that, “in most situations redistributive policies can
only operate on increases in income” (WCED 1987: 47). Existing wealth is
sacrosanct:
The number of years required to bring the poverty ratio down from 50 to 10 %
ranges from:
• 18–24 years if per capita income grows at 3 %,
• 26–36 years if it grown at 2 %, and
• 51–70 years if it grows only at 1 %.
In each case, the shorter time is associated with the redistribution of 25 % of the
incremental income of the richest ﬁfth of the population and the longer period with
no redistribution (WCED 1987: 47).
This no-net-loss justice deﬁnition has been, and still is, a taboo. It dovetails
nicely with the liberal Enlightenment ideas behind the mainstream economic
paradigm. Goal 8 in the SDGs, in particular its ﬁrst target, reiterates the imperative
of growth for everyone, even the super-rich:
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Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive
employment and decent work for all
8.1 Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in
particular, at least 7 % gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed
countries (UN 2015: 16)
This time, the explicit connection with upping the chance for redistribution
policies is not even made. To be fair, there is SDG 10, “Reduce inequality within
and among countries”—but its target 10.1 makes very clear that this can only
happen with yet more growth: “By 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income
growth of the bottom 40 % of the population at a rate higher than the national
average” (ibid.: 17).
3.3.1 Which Real Qualities of Development Lie Behind
Monetarized Predictions?
The group hit hardest by the assumption that everything always keeps on growing is
the one for which the sustainable development agenda was originally created: future
generations. If we apply the no-net-loss justice deﬁnitions to our children and
grandchildren, we need to ensure that they do not pay too little for the outcomes of
investments that are paid for by generations today. The cost–beneﬁt analyses of
political decision-making on public or social investments should therefore include
future costs and beneﬁts. Who is paying and how much are they beneﬁting from
building roads or alternative transport systems, schools or parks, renewable or fossil
energy infrastructures, and so on?
For the mainstream economics mind-set the answer is as easy as it is convenient:
since economic growth and per capita incomes will continue to rise exponentially,
cost–beneﬁt analyses almost always employ a social discount rate, meaning that the
costs for current and future generations are not weighted equally but are compar-
atively higher for those living and paying today.
So, instead of being worried about how future generations will be able to satisfy
their needs, weak sustainability economists worry that the current generation will
take on the cost of investing, while most of the beneﬁts are reaped by future
generations. Adding the extrapolations of decreasing technology prices and
increasing efﬁciency gains renders ‘uneconomic’ many of the projects that others
would declare urgently necessary to keep within safe natural operating spaces.
Criticism of these assumptions therefore comes from economists who bring some
physical data into their equations. The seminal reports of Nicholas Stern, the 2006
The Economics of Climate Change, and the multi-scientist study The Economics of
Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), coordinated by Pavan Sukhdev from 2008
onward, both explicitly call for zero or even negative discount rates.
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Both of these studies came to this conclusion because they acknowledged the
fragile state of ecosystems today. For the authors, swift and signiﬁcant investment
is necessary to restore their balance so that they can continue to provide the bio-
physical conditions that humans have enjoyed for thousands of years. The sooner
these investments are undertaken, the lower the eventual costs for overall devel-
opment. The economic costs of inaction today will rise so quickly that GDP growth
will not be able to outstrip them. Depending on the range of risks and impacts
calculated, Stern predicted losing between at least 5 % and more than 20 % of
global GDP each year indeﬁnitely, while the TEEB report estimated the cost of
biodiversity and ecosystem damage would reach 18 % of global economic output
by 2050.
These claims are supported by the Oxford Martin Commission for Future
Generations chaired by Pascal Lamy, a former director-general of the WTO. The
primary purview of its work was to check where in current analytical concepts and
governance solutions the ignorance about the future was highest. The 2013 report
diagnosed a structural discrimination against future generations and concluded that
in “a world of considerable uncertainty about future levels of well-being” neither
linear extrapolation of trends nor short-term returns on investments in imperfect
markets were suitable measures for policy design. Instead, “[W]hen evaluating the
costs of action and inaction, policymakers need to ensure discounting embraces a
more sophisticated appreciation of the role of ethics, risk, and the scale of possible
damages in the future” (Oxford Martin Commission 2013: 61).
The science on ecosystems has shown that expecting further exponential growth
everywhere in the world for a long time might not be a fair base for ethical
considerations. Also, data from rich countries shows that growth rates have been
slumping for two decades (Wahl/Gödderz 2012). The research results on human
well-being have shown that this might not be such terrible news as long as the
growth-dependent institutional setups are changed and measures corrected so that
one can see what is really going on underneath the growth saga. Without this
transparency and accountability the GDP and monetary output measures keep us
blind to where a lot of uneconomic and unproductive ‘wealth’ is created and
concentrated.
For the majority of people on this planet—the 3 billion still living in poverty—
more and better access to goods and services is urgently needed. But the dogged
pursuit of absolute economic growth is not necessarily leading to this desired
outcome. GDP rose from $13 trillion with 5 billion people in 1987 to $72 trillion
with 7 billion people in 2012. Roughly speaking, this means we now live in a world
with economic output equaling $10,000 per capita compared to one equaling $2600
per capita 25 years ago. Technically, no one should have to suffer from hunger and
extreme poverty any longer. So reaching sustainability is not about more and more
output of everything for everyone but about getting the right outputs in the right
places into the right hands.
This is the key message that the inventors of the Genuine Progress Indicator
(GPI) and its predecessor, the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) want
to illustrate. The GPI seeks to measure how economic growth can actually destroy
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social, human and environmental wealth and this methodology is mirrored in other
indices like the National Welfare Index (NWI) in Germany. While adhering to a
monetary valuation of progress, these indicators make an effort to identify the ‘use
value’ created or depleted in the course of a particular path of development. Starting
with the exchange value numbers of GDP, these are adjusted by using 24 different
components that express gains or losses in social, natural and human capital. These
include, for example, pollution and ozone levels, CO2 emissions, loss of farmland
and primary forests and, in line with many well-being ﬁndings, income distribution,
crime rates, loss of leisure time and also the time people spend in unpleasant
activities like commuting. The beneﬁts of non-marketized work at home, or as
volunteers, are added as increases in wealth by counting the amount that it would
cost to employ someone to do the babysitting and cleaning etc. (Genuine Progress
2014).
The overall goal is not to create an alternative cumulative indicator of sustain-
able development, as the information loss through monetarization and high
aggregation levels prevails. The GPI was and is intended to deliver a warning as to
where increased GDP contrasts with negative individual and social experiences, i.e.,
when uneconomic growth is reached and the marginal beneﬁts of more GDP
growth are lower than its marginal costs.
A growing group of researchers and some governments have calculated GPI per
capita and compared results with GDP per capita. Similarly to Easterlin’s ﬁndings,
they observed a parting of the two curves at a certain point of development. In a
2013 journal article, many of the leading scholars in ecological economics like
Robert Costanza, Tim Jackson and John Talberth brought together the insights of
GPI calculations in 17 countries from ﬁve continents, representing 53 % of the
world’s population. Next to an assessment of where the costs of GDP growth start
to outweigh its beneﬁts they also compared GPI per capita ﬁndings with other
indicators like ecological footprint, the UN Development Programme or UNDP’s
Human Development Index or HDI and life satisfaction surveys in those countries
(Kubiszewski et al. 2013).
By using Purchasing Power Parity to convert all GPI and GDP ﬁndings into
2005 US dollars, they added up all the country data into Global GDP and GPI per
capita ﬁgures to compare their developments. While the authors do not claim their
ﬁgures were absolutely accurate, as both GPI and GDP are hard to determine, the
trends are clear (Fig. 3.5).
The authors identiﬁed the start of uneconomic growth on a global scale in the
late 1970s: “Global GPI/capita peaked in 1978, about the same time that global
Ecological Footprint exceeded global Biocapacity. Life Satisfaction in almost all
countries has also not improved signiﬁcantly since 1975. Globally, GPI/capita does
not increase beyond a GDP/capita of around $7000/capita” (Kubiszewski et al.
2013: 57). The primary policy recommendation taken from these ﬁndings comes
very close to the Brundtland Report’s redistribution goal but without declaring that
we ﬁrst need to grow more: “If we distributed income more equitably around the
planet, the current world GDP ($67 trillion/year) could support 9.6 billion people at
$7000/capita” (Kubiszewski et al. 2013). In 2012 we had already reached a global
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GDP of $72 trillion. So what do these impressive numbers say about ubiquitous
scarcity and thus the endless need to grow?
A proper examination of which resources are scarce, which are not, and how all
of them are allocated, pushes economic accounting to the sidelines and puts ethics,
political will and power relations center stage. We see utterly wasteful and unjust
consumption, production and distribution patterns.
Tracking the actual output of food, for example, shows that we have what we need
to feed everyone well. According to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization,
roughly one third of what is produced for human consumption is never eaten. This
amounts to about 1.3 billion tons per year. Examining the ﬁgures by country, we see
that people in Sub-Saharan Africa, South as well as South East Asia only waste
around 6–10 kg per person per year whereas Europeans and North Americans throw
away between 95 and 115 kg of perfectly edible food (FAO 2011: v).
This pattern is repeated with other goods as well. In Britain around 30 % of the
contents of the average wardrobe has not been worn for at least a year, which gives
us the ﬁgure of 1.7 billion items of clothing unused in the United Kingdom alone
(Gracey/Moon 2012: 2).
In 2006, the McKinsey Global Institute calculated that the world’s ﬁnancial
markets struggled to ﬁnd investment opportunities for about 3.5 times global GDP
at the time. This was the staggering ﬁgure of $167 trillion in desperate liquidity
(Farrell et al. 2008: 7) at the same time that the international community could not
Fig. 3.5 Comparing world GDP/capita and world GPI/capita trends. Source Kubiszewski et al.
(2013: 63)
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(and cannot) ﬁnd enough money to supply sustainable energy, sanitation and food
to a third of the world’s population (Scharmer/Kaufer 2013: 94).
So, we can see that quite a bit of the capital (energy) is withdrawn from the
system even though demand for more produced goods or use value is clearly there.
The mainstream model of the economy in Fig. 3.3 does not capture this. But if the
purchasing power among the poor does not meet capital owners’ expectations of
return on investment it will not flow there. Current ‘growth’ measurement standards
are indifferent to such distributive effects. They count a euro that pays for a private
jet as having created the same ‘value’ as one that pays for a ton of rice.
In rich countries slowing growth is usually equated with unemployment, the
biggest threat to well-being. A team of economists at the Institute for Sustainable
Development and International Relations (IDDRI) at the Science Po university in
France has conducted a study on “A post-growth society for the twenty-ﬁrst cen-
tury. Does prosperity have to wait for the return of economic growth?” Here we ﬁnd
collated evidence about jobless growth, a disconnect between wage rises and
productivity gains and a missing link between long-term growth and employment
levels. The researchers conclude that political changes in labor policies, taxes,
pension and health systems, and investment criteria would allow for much less
growth-dependent societies in which individual and social prosperity are not
compromised (Chancel et al. 2013).
So, sticking with the mantra in which endless economic growth is needed is a
great way of avoiding the political responsibility and struggles that unlocking those
path dependencies requires. This Herculean task is not helped by the perverse
inequalities that the real rather than theoretical market logics, laws and institutions
like our monetary system have created, overlooked or disguised by undifferentiated
cost–beneﬁt and growth analyses. In the United States, for example, decoupling
productivity gains from real wage developments went hand in hand with lower
taxation on capital and wealth. This cocktail has driven GDP to unprecedented
heights and inequality levels back to those of the 1920s.
In a podcast for the Economist, Robert Reich, labor secretary under Bill Clinton
and an economics professor explains: “Most of the economic gains in the past
25 years have gone to the top 15–20 % of Americans, but more recently, in the past
six to seven years, most of the economic gains have gone to the top one percent….
The average CEO is making about 380 times more than the average worker—a
huge gap relative to what it used to be 40 years ago—it was about 30 times” (Reich
2007). This interview predated the ﬁnancial crisis, which has accelerated still fur-
ther the rise in income of those controlling the factors of production.
One major cause of this trend has been documented by the OECD in its 2008
report Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries. In
countries where ﬁnancial capital gains and self-employment income are taxed at
lower rates than wages the pattern is clear: the top 20 % keep on diverging from the
middle classes and lower income strata. Real wages have stagnated in most of the
OECD countries since the 1980s and in many the trend is “moderate but signiﬁ-
cant” while some countries like Germany, Canada, Norway, the United States and
Italy report ‘signiﬁcant’ changes.
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The primary policy measure, especially for any longer-term correction of this
structural discrimination, was outlined as follows: “Relying on taxing more and
spending more as a response to inequality can only be a temporary measure. The
only sustainable way to reduce inequality is to stop the underlying widening of
wages and income from capital” (OECD 2008: 3). In this context it is interesting
that the OECD report did not include the income of the super-rich because it would
have been hard to measure by standard income indicators. What Thomas Picketty
called the rentier class (2014) earns and manages its wealth differently.
The Tax Justice Network (TJN), a coalition of researchers and activists, esti-
mated in 2012 that some 30 % of global ﬁnancial wealth was owned by the top
0.001 % of the world’s population or about 91,000 people. The next 19 % was
owned by the next 0.01 %, or 800,000 people and 32 % belonged to the next
0.1 %, or 8 million people. This left 19 % of the world’s ﬁnancial wealth for the
remaining 99.9 % of the world’s population (TJN 2012: 5).
These numbers are probably utterly out of date by now. Oxfam International
brought new calculations to the 2014 WEF showing that the richest 85 people
owned assets which amounted to the same value as those owned by the poorest 3.5
billion people. Since the report used numbers gleaned from the ‘Forbes Billionaires
List,’ the magazine published an update three months later: the top tier had shrunk
to 67 individuals.
The wealth of the wealthiest is growing so fast that the lists need monthly
updates. Within one year, from 2013 to 2014, the threshold for qualiﬁcation into the
top 20 billionaires list jumped from $23 to $31 billion (Moreno 2014).
TJN went further and also examined levels of tax avoidance and the harmful
impacts of tax competition and tax havens in offshore centers. In 2012 they pub-
lished a report by James Henry, a former chief economist at McKinsey. According to
him, at least $21 trillion and possibly up to $32 trillion of “unreported privately held
ﬁnancial wealth” is squirreled away in tax havens. This is a sum, “equivalent to the
size of the United States and Japanese economies combined” (Henry 2012: 1). And
this is only ﬁnancial wealth. It excludes real estate, yachts and other non-ﬁnancial
assets owned via offshore structures.
Because this is unreported wealth, inevitably none of these sums have so far
made it into the ofﬁcial statistics, so global wealth inequality is much higher than
the data we usually draw upon suggests. In order to put the potential of redis-
tributing existing wealth into perspective, TJN calculated how much a tax of 30 %
on a conservative estimate of 3 % capital gains on those $21–32 trillion would
generate. The resulting $190–280 billion is double the amount that the OECD
countries combined spend on all overseas development assistance around the world
(Henry 2012: 2). Additional taxes, for example, on inheritance, a wealth tax or a
collection of tax avoided in years past would increase the numbers accordingly.
TJN estimates that the $21 trillion belongs to no more than 10 million people
who can afford a team of advisers specializing in the most effective ways of
avoiding tax. This casts a very different light on scarcity, just distribution practices
or proper formula for redistribution policies. The ahistorical ethics of no-net-loss is
unmasked as just as half-baked as closed system physics.
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A future-oriented ethics and also management strategy was actually deﬁned as
part of sustainable development: sufﬁciency. Next to efﬁciency (no unnecessary
waste) and consistency (solutions ﬁt local—environmental—systems) this strategy
is not so much technical but highly normative. It means embracing the idea that
there can and should be enough production and consumption. Phrased this way it
sounds like the baseline of sustainable development. Enough for everyone forever.
Enough and not less, however, also means enough and not more. At least on one
ﬁnite planet.
Yet, the economic thinking that is so overwhelmingly influential in politics and
public discourse today simply excludes sufﬁciency from what could be a feasible
solution. It is equated to a depression or moving back into caves. Moreover, it is
often mainstream economists who declare that any idea of sufﬁciency, or no further
economic growth in rich economies, would impair the ‘human freedom’ to invent,
innovate and be creative. Not even in countries with stable population levels can
their theory conceive of how living up to human potential would not lead to more
market sales.
Critical conceptual environment and development thinkers like Wolfgang Sachs
readily point out that only rich people can fall into the trap of seeing sufﬁciency
solely as a regression. For every person living in deprivation and hunger the end of
suffering is an aspiration (Sachs 2015: 2). In addition, Sachs continues, refraining
from having more than enough might be less of an altruistic move, but instead a
step toward justice and respect in a system where the overflow of wealth in some
parts is directly connected to exploitation in others (ibid.).
The idea of providing enough for everyone within the carrying capacity of the
planet was iconized in the ‘doughnut’ by Kate Raworth, UK researcher and cam-
paigner for Oxfam in the run-up to the Rio+20 Summit. Her graph combines the
Planetary Boundaries with minimum entitlements to social foundations to which
every person on this planet should be granted access. The resulting ‘doughnut’
shows that there is a corridor or “safe and just operating space” in which devel-
opment can be sustainably pursued.
The social foundations in Fig. 3.6 do not reflect a scientiﬁc assessment, but
instead the results of what governments had stated to be their priorities in the run-up
to the conference. They are therefore not deﬁnitive but illustrative. An under-
standing of the qualities of most important social foundations and of which gov-
ernance solutions can most successfully embed them will become more precise with
more research, just as the Planetary Boundaries will. Unfortunately, none of these
empirical searches will be helped by mainstream economic approaches. In these
approaches, only more monetary growth would mean that societies could pay for
cleaning up the environment and grant some support to their unﬁt citizens—who
could not otherwise survive.
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3.3.2 Unveiling the Money Magic
On checking the statistics one can see that we do not have too little but far too much
money racing around the globe. We live in a situation in which there is no lack of
money but rather a lack of credit to fund real economic activity where it is needed.
Instead, the search for trillions of dollars for good returns on investment causes
frequent bubbles and economic instability. Sounds absurd? That is what I thought
until I read good old Karl Marx. He explains how, in the context of the ascent of the
mainstream economic paradigm, money has been given a peculiar function—a
function that Polanyi acknowledged when he called it a ﬁctitious commodity, but
that economics textbooks overlook. It is very relevant when seeking to understand
roadblocks to sustainable development.
Fig. 3.6 The sustainable development doughnut. Source Based on Raworth (2012: 4)
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Money is typically portrayed as an equivalent value expression for all types of
goods and services. It is deﬁned as serving three functions. As a ‘medium of
exchange’ it facilitates trade between goods. If a ﬁsherman had to barter whatever
he had caught directly for all the goods and services that he needed, it would require
a lot of work, or luck, to ﬁnd trading partners in possession of what he wanted, and
they would also have to want ﬁsh in return. Money eases barter by dividing it into
two transactions. The ﬁsherman gets money for his ﬁsh from whoever wants the
ﬁsh, and gives that money to whoever happens to offer what he himself wants. As a
‘unit of account’ money therefore allows the ﬁsherman to measure the exchange
value of what he has and to estimate how much of which good or service he can get
on selling his produce. This also allows him to start planning a more complex
ﬁsheries enterprise and to use the money as a ‘store of value’ until he has saved
enough, so that he can purchase another boat. During periods of low catches this
also allows him to continue buying goods or services without having any ﬁsh to
sell.
These three functions are listed in the mainstream textbooks. Here, exchange
value and use value are directly linked. Each economic process involves investing
money in order to produce an output whose value is higher than that of the single
input factors. Savings or credit is applied to enable productive processes. The
investor or creditor often participates in the generated surplus value for the pru-
dence that saving money took or the risk that taking on a debt involves.
Thus goes the money story, and originally, as the term ‘commodity money’
expresses, there was something of real value behind it, e.g., beads or rare metals
like gold. Marx’s equation for this function of money goes as follows: C–M–C’, or
in other words commodities of a given value are available as input—one applies
money to enable a process of combining them—commodities with higher value
form the output (Marx 1887: 102–108).
This narrative is so strong that even today we think of money as something
thing-like. But it was in fact a social innovation and over the course of the Great
Transition stripped of any real use value, making it ‘ﬁat money.’ This type of
money exists only because of government regulation. Its paper value tokens or
numbers on computer screens have no real value at all. They are not real wealth but
a claim on wealth and only function because you and the person or institution
owing you the money accept this relational duty—or have to accept it by legal
imposition.
So money is a relationship, as the root of the word credit—the Latin term
credere or believing in—indicates. The paper notes of the Bank of England still
have the following pledge on them: “I promise to pay the bearer on demand the sum
of….” This type of money is a form of debt: Someone owes you something of real
value. It is a promise of access to something one desires in the future.
With this innovation societies gave themselves the collective illusion that such
faith-based wealth tokens could be transformed into any use value at any time.
James Tobin (1918–2002), who won the Nobel Prize for economics in 1981,
summarized this effect nicely:
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The community’s wealth now has two components: the real goods accumulated through
past real investment and ﬁduciary or paper ‘goods’ manufactured by the government from
thin air. Of course the nonhuman wealth of such a nation ‘really’ consists only of its
tangible capital. But, as viewed by the inhabitants of the nation individually, wealth
exceeds the tangible capital stock by the size of what we might term the ﬁduciary issue.
This is an illusion, but only one of the many fallacies of composition which are basic to any
economy or any society. The illusion can be maintained unimpaired so long as society does
not actually try to convert all of its paper wealth into goods (Tobin 1965: 676).
The beauty of this transformation was that there were far fewer limitations on the
amount of money that could be created. But how did this impact the functions of
money? This is the key question that Marx was looking at and he showed that the
useful public good or social illusion was slowly but surely turned into a private
commodity serving the accumulation of ever more ﬁnancial wealth in any form.
For Marx, this was one of the essential and speciﬁc features of a capitalist market
economy in comparison to other forms of market economies. His original use of the
term ‘capital’ expresses the objectiﬁcation of value in the form of ﬁnancial ‘prod-
ucts’ that enable people to not only spend money on buying other commodities but
also to apply it, with the sole aim of accumulating more money.
Marx expressed the difference by turning the normal money function around:
C-M-C’ (the purpose of money is to serve a higher input/output goal of creating
something with more use value) becomes M-C-M’ in which the purpose of money
is to make more money. It is applied in any economic transaction that promises
more exchange value and thus more ﬁnancial return on investment (Marx 1887:
102–108). What is actually done in this process becomes secondary.
Prior to Polanyi’s ﬁctitious commodities, Marx showed how ‘ﬁnancial capital’
becomes an input factor just like all the goods whose value it should express. The
analogy expressing what he called a socioeconomic ‘craziness’ was the general
genus of “the animal.” Imagine a world in which it would suddenly come to life and
interact with lions, tigers, rabbits and all the other creatures that this term had been
created to subsume (Heinrich 2005, 76). Making money a ‘value object’ destined to
be sold in markets is the incarnation of an abstract idea that turns debt into wealth.
This new commodity, however, is the most desirable of all as long as the
conversion belief holds strongly. It does not rot, it needs little room for storage and
promises to transform itself into any use value at any time. And for those with more
money than their own need satisfaction requires, its application creates even more
money without much actual work being required. In several languages we have the
expression ‘make your money work for you,’ which refers to money invested
purely to generate interest. This became a strong desire in accumulation-seeking
individuals and soon we saw the emergence of private banks and lending
organizations.
This is where the ‘public good’ concept of the way a ﬁnancial sector should be
set up was very beneﬁcial, although it no longer reflects reality. Public goods serve
all of society, so a ﬁnancial sector designed from this perspective would have the
role of ensuring that credit could flow where it was needed for use value generation.
As a consequence, the fewer the costs involved in accomplishing this service, the
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better for society. So the ﬁnancial sector should account for as small a percentage of
total economic activity as possible (Dietz/O’Neill 2013: 110). The people working
in it need to be paid for their managerial work since the actual value created for a
society begins elsewhere, in the productive economy.
Does this resemble the ﬁnancial system of today? Certainly not. The idea that
ﬁnance is serving the economy is actively maintained, but increasing deregulation
has allowed its institutions to do far more than matching the received money with
credit needs. Today, private banks create a huge amount of the money themselves.
While governments still control currency, over 90 % of the money supply is issued
by private, commercial banks and institutions that leverage the deposited amounts
multiple times when issuing credit, i.e., debt (Daly/Farley 2010: 289–291).
Under the regulation of ‘fractional reserve banking,’ a bank only needs to have a
small sum to be able to create big amounts of money. A reserve requirement of
10 %, for example, means that the bank can use a $100 deposit to create $900 in
credit, out of which maybe $500 will make it into another bank account leading to
another $4500 of new money, and so on. In some cases before the ﬁnancial crisis of
2008 these reserves were as low as 2–3 % or even zero.
Not all of this magically created money becomes productive credit by any
means. Most of it circulates between ﬁnancial institutions, while only a third of it
enters the real economy (Scharmer/Kaufer 2013: 101–103). In practice this has
meant that, in the last few decades, the amount of money in circulation has been
growing much faster than the output of the real economy. Foreign exchange
transactions of $1.5 quadrillion outnumber international trade by a factor of 75
(Scharmer/Kaufer 2013: 94). This has led economists like Tobin (cited above) to
demand a ﬁnancial transaction tax that would slow such speculative flows down
and provide some revenue that could be used by the government institutions
safeguarding the public good image with gigantic bailouts or guarantees.
So the idea of turning money into a commodity and then stripping it of any
real-world embodiment has led to what has been called the ‘ﬁnancialization’ of
economies: all value that is exchanged is captured, counted and expressed in
monetary ﬁgures and thus easily transformed into ﬁnancial instruments that can be
traded in markets. Unsurprisingly the ﬁnancial sector now contributes about 10 %
of GDP in countries like the United Kingdom and the United States, up from 2.3 %
in the 1950s (Ferguson 2008: 6).
Meanwhile, the excess of ‘wealth’ leads to an increase of prices of already
existing assets like real estate and stocks, but not necessarily to the creation of new
production and innovation that would bring new use value to where it is really
needed. This was accelerated by making shareholder value the prime goal in cor-
porate governance, and giving it greater importance than what is actually produced
and how. But if money’s purpose is to be applied for a good and quick ﬁnancial
return, risk calculations in comparison to the estimated proﬁts speak against poor
countries and people with non-Western legislation and a lack of purchasing power.
Behind this ﬁnancialization trend and the increasing protection and privileging
of investors lies, of course, the view that money, as capital, is a commodity or input
factor equal to all the others. Of course it entitles its owner to a share of the
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generated surplus value. Some mainstream economists say that the investor is in
effect paid for abstaining from the immediate utility gains that using the money for
consumption would have brought, had he not lent it to someone else. Others would
say that interest is necessary to incentivize paying back, and a justiﬁed premium for
the risk involved in lending it to others.
All of this might have been true in times in which shareholders were also
stakeholders and typically longer-term investors. Today, the vast majority of stocks
are held by sharehoppers. Buying and selling within seconds is not really taking
part in the entrepreneurial risk of a business. The traders doing it do not care what
the companies do. Their algorithms track price developments and seek to gain from
differences at times of purchase and selling. Whether the companies flourish or tank
does not matter to them.
It does not come as a great surprise that proﬁt making increasingly occurs for
those inventing more and more ﬁnancial instruments or ‘products’ like derivatives,
credit default swaps, futures and options that are exchanged and traded in markets
totally removed from the commodity world. We need a third equation: M-M-M′.
Financialization has several consequences from mind-sets to the structural dri-
vers of development: the importance of ﬁnancial motives and motivations increases
in line with the influence of ﬁnancial institutions, elites and markets in governing
institutions. Big parts of the ﬁnancial system today have lost any resemblance to the
ﬁduciary role that Tobin foresaw. Trillions in desperate liquidity chase around the
globe in search of good returns while money for development aid, climate pro-
tection or refugees cannot be found.
Meanwhile, the expectation of a constant return on each investment leads to
compound interest developments that are simply absurd if one takes the long view
of future generations. Garrett Hardin (1915–2003), a famous American ecologist,
gave an example in 1985:
Suppose that the thirty pieces of silver Judas received for betraying Christ had
been worth $30; and suppose that he had put this into a bank account bearing 5 %
compound interest, payable in gold. Presuming the present price of gold, the initial
capital would amount to 2.5 grams of gold. How long would it take for the Judas
Account to be worth a weight of gold equal to the weight of the entire earth
(5.983 × 1027 g)? Just 1292 years (Hardin 1985: 72).
3.3.3 Summary: Opening up Mainstream Economic Ideas Is
Key for ‘Our Common Future’
Section 3.3 highlighted how the ideas and concepts summarized in Table 3.1 are
among the root causes of ﬁnancialization and its utterly unsustainable patterns of
exploitation, allocation and accumulation. It showed what gets lost if these concepts
provide the explanations and evidence for sustainability policymaking. Most
importantly, it highlighted how the mind-sets and narratives building on these
3.3 How Mainstream Economics Anticipate the Future 111
concepts encourage worldviews, personality structures and justiﬁcation logics that
might be very transformational, but not toward the goals and principles that the
sustainable development agenda has adopted.
“Economic thought systems matter because they are at the heart of an intellectual battle
over the future direction of society,” wrote MIT scholar Otto Scharmer and researcher
Katrin Kaufer in their 2013 book on working toward more sustainable economies. The
mainstream belief system, they continue, “has given Wall Street a de facto veto over public
policy making that no other group or industry enjoys.” Simon Johnson, another MIT
professor and former IMF chief economist, is cited by them: “by 1998, it was part of the
worldview of the Washington elite that what was good for Wall Street was good for
America” (all from Scharmer/Kaufer 2013: 71).
The following summary is thus also the conclusion of this chapter. It briefly runs
through the four big ideas listed in Table 3.1 and why they fall short when we seek
to understand how to satisfy human needs while respecting nature’s law. The
discussions above have shown that they are scientiﬁcally flawed. Yet, through their
materialization in today’s market and government structures, these ideas have
become very real in their impact on people, their decision-making and their freedom
to do things differently and more sustainably.
The reflexive ontology behind this book sees the opening up of worldviews and
belief systems as the ﬁrst step in system innovation strategies: identify which
arguments, practices or laws are built around flawed assumptions and ideas and
understand how they hamper more sustainable developments. Engaging in trans-
forming such path dependencies will of course always be a highly political, con-
tested and power-ridden process whose outcome no one can predict. But shedding
vested intellectual interests often comes before shedding economic vested interests:
sense and legitimacy of the status quo start crumbling and alternative practices
multiply, inspired by an emerging imaginary that there are indeed alternatives.
Trying to understand the world by dividing it into pieces creates an imaginary in
which the relationships and generative rules underlying system dynamics get lost
behind numbers and detailed descriptions of the individual pieces. This atomistic
view of mechanical systems suggests that the single items remain unchanged and
between them one can detect and thus manage linear and reproducible causalities in
an additive or subtractive approach. System dynamics are viewed as predictable and
controllable as long as the properties of the individual parts are understood well.
There are no time delays or feedback loops that allow one to anticipate the fact that
stopping a particular cause will no longer stop a particular reaction once system
dynamics have reached tipping points. General ignorance of the Tyranny of Small
Decisions is related to this: large output changes need large input changes. It is this
‘particle’ worldview or paradigm that leads to the common juxtaposition of
incremental versus radical change.
But applying this view to complex systems ﬁlled with humans is not helpful, as
the ﬁnancial crises show. Using it to inform strategies of human need satisfaction
offers very little insight about the matter it is supposed to address: utility or hap-
piness is a relative and context-dependent experience and not a thing that can be
privately held and hoarded. Meanwhile, natural capital is a web of life and not a
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stack of resources and services to be freely disassembled, reassembled and
substituted.
Neither happiness nor nature qualify as ‘pieces’ whose properties stay the same
if they are relocated. Nor can properties be easily reinstalled once single items have
been taken out of their former setting. Understanding the world in systems, on the
other hand, provides a very different understanding of the developments and their
trajectories. Notions of tipping points, non-linear developments, delays and run-
away effects, as well as irreversible changes and uncertainty enter the picture
instead. This changes the perceptions of risk and even cost–beneﬁt analyses
tremendously. Adopting a precautionary approach becomes more of a rational
strategy than one easily dismissed as anti-progress. This is the effect of paradigm
shifts as described by Kuhn:
. . . the historian of science may be tempted to exclaim that when paradigms change, the
world itself changes with them. Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments
and look in new places. Even more important, during revolutions scientists see new and
different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before.
It is rather as if the professional community had been suddenly transported to another planet
where familiar objects are seen in a different light and are joined by unfamiliar ones as well.
. . . In so far as their only recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we may
want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world (Kuhn 1962:
111).
Understanding the world through quantifying and monetizing has subjected ever
more areas of social being and collaboration as well as human–nature relations to
the logic of markets. A non-market relationship or good is transformed into a
commodity that is, from now on, compensated for with a payment, wage, rent or
interest. It is now captured in economic statistics and an exchange value frame of
willingness-to-pay enters the relation: the worth of everything is expressed in pri-
ces. Marglin dedicated his entire book to discussing how thinking like an economist
undermines the earlier guiding principles and frames around those relations: people
or communities who were formerly rather self-reliant and governed by reciprocity
become dependent on market processes and the exchange values of their particular
goods and services (Marglin 2010). With money come economistic mind-sets and
ﬁnancial motivations. The wider cultural meaning of work as a productive and
caring activity is reduced to something done to make money.
While some may argue that this has delivered on a more efﬁcient division of
labor and specialization, it does not at all automatically mean that the relations and
the quality of services like childcare, nursing, housework, etc., improves. Or that
people enjoy their work more and perform better. At the same time, this way of
thinking justiﬁes anti-poor resentment because the lower the price of what one
offers to society (i.e., the wage), the less worth it has. Therefore, having no job is
viewed as a sign of not making enough effort.
Meanwhile, expanding ﬁnancialization also means that the structural imperative
of needing even more growth is expanded. Using interest-bearing or debt-based
forms of money means that the borrower not only has to ensure an output that
returns the input factor costs and his income in the form of proﬁt, but also the
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interest he has to pay for the credit. Each enterprise owner therefore operates under
constrained conditions when it comes to making production processes more sus-
tainable, equitable or simply constant in output. Thanks especially to quarterly
reporting and very short returns on investment expectations, they work with
additional drivers toward the already high incentive to externalize environmental
and social costs in weakly regulated competitive economies.
Regarding natural exploitation, Trucost, a green accounting specialist, has
estimated that the world’s 3000 largest corporations caused $2.15 trillion in envi-
ronmental damage in 2008 alone—and this did not register on their balance sheets
(Trucost 2012). Imagine what internalizing these costs would mean for their proﬁt
warnings and thus stock values. So neither monetization nor market prices are
neutral indicators or just allocation mechanisms, but are instead deﬁned through
highly political and power-laden processes.
Understanding the world by tracking accumulation of monetized values there-
fore keeps us from seeing where more productivity becomes void of productiveness
and utility or where growth is causing irreversible damage in our ecosystems.
Sociologist Harald Welzer describes the ‘degrading’ effect for humans:
This is the exact form in which work is understood in national economic theory: as an
unlimited, endless activity that does not have a speciﬁc, limited, product-related objective,
but is dedicated to the ceaseless creation of value—consequently the never-ending pro-
duction of ‘growth.’ Marx referred to this process as the disappearance of concrete labor
into exchange value (Welzer 2011: 22).
In affluent countries, as Jorgen Norgaard, professor at the Technical University
of Denmark, has written, “much of the growth in GDP over the last years can be
ascribed to pulling activities like child care, health care, cooking, entertainment,
maintaining houses, etc. from the non-paid amateur economy into the professional
economy” (Nørgård 2013: 63). All of these effects are part of what the decoupling
agenda will measure: the economy ‘immaterializes’ itself. But nothing new has
necessarily been created. Only the way it is done has changed.
The same things happen when corporations run by CEOs rather than owners
gear their business toward increasing shareholder value, for example, through
tactical issuance, sales and buying back of stocks. Big corporations now have huge
internal ﬁnancial departments whose only purpose is to increase the ﬁrm’s market
value and top executive pay is usually coupled directly to the ﬁrm’s stock market
value. For societies, however, exploding prices for stocks, houses, raw materials
and land cannot count as a sign of real wealth generation, particularly if lower strata
of society lose access to them. Instead, this type of ‘growth’ is a sign of too much
liquidity and at the same time perpetuates its concentration even further. The
by-catch are economic bubbles and instability.
Understanding the world by comparing and ranking all of the monetized price
indicators instead of the underlying items does, however, mean that ﬁctitious wealth
can continue to grow for a long time. Capital substitutability thinking allows for
Tobin’s social myth to be stretched so far that consultancy ﬁrms like the Boston
Consulting Group really issue forecasts like the following: “for Chinese children
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born in 2009, continued economic progress will mean that over the course of their
lives, they can expect to consume thirty-eight times more material goods than their
grandparents” (Asia Society 2012). Since 2010, the WEF’s Global Risk Reports
have, however, put water and food supply crises and rising greenhouse gas emis-
sions among the top ten global risks of the next ten years. So while Chinese kids
might keep on amassing ﬁnancial capital, they could never transform it into 38
times more material goods.
Meanwhile, applying an exchange value or cost–beneﬁt lens in all relations does
affect human value judgments and our willingness to help, relate and feel connected
to others and nature. One of the ongoing examples here is the cooptation of the idea
of a ‘Sharing Economy’ by capitalist players. What started with the idea that people
would make their use value items available to others (couchsurﬁng) has been pulled
into the logics of exchange value. The mind-set of ‘what could I give to others to
enjoy—or enjoy with them jointly’ is transformed into a ﬁnancialized mind-set of
‘what can I get money for from others that I did not think of before now.’ The
enabling technologies might be the same but the intent and purpose behind these
social innovations is completely different—as will be the relations emerging from it.
I therefore side with Heyman and Ariely who suggest “that compensations for
employment and effort should be considered separately for social and monetary
markets and that the level and type of compensation should be designed to ﬁt the
deﬁned relationship” (Heyman/Ariely 2004: 793).
In conclusion we see how a blind emphasis on exchange value in mainstream
accounting tools and standards has helped a situation to emerge in which the
ﬁnancial sector does not serve the real economy anymore, but rules it. It does that at
a tremendously high cost to societies and sustainability. Of course, one might argue
that people wishing to exert power and undercut societal agreements do so without
taking the detour into mainstream economic thinking and models. But when it
comes to rationalizing one’s decisions, arguing them to the public and creating
narratives in which particular interests seem compatible with an image of public
beneﬁt and good, they have performed a great service.
Also, the reflexive ontology presented in Chap. 2 has shown that biasing frames
and selective interpretations of situations are an unavoidable aspect of human
existence. They can be a conscious act of strategic framing or tactical misrepre-
sentation of information. But when it comes to understanding the effect of para-
digms and their shifting we talk about much deeper sociocultural transformations.
Elinor Ostrom in her 2009 Nobel Prize lecture highlights how the—of course—
purely economic Homo economicus saga has impacted the design of institutions
across the board:
Designing institutions to force entirely self-interested individuals to achieve better out-
comes has been the major goal posited by policy analysts for much of the past half century.
Extensive empirical research leads me to argue that instead, a core goal of public policy
should be to facilitate the development of institutions that bring out the best in humans
(Ostrom 2009: 435).
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So what could become the major goal instead? Summarizing twenty-ﬁrst century
research about human needs and how to align them with nature’s qualities brings us
very close to the differentiated framework of sufﬁciency of Sachs. He suggested it
as early as the 1990s, and I did not anticipate this resemblance when I began to
write the book.
For Sachs, sufﬁciency goes far beyond simply having less stuff. It tackles several
unsustainable trends of the current development paradigm at once. In the frame-
work he differentiates four ‘E’s’ in German (Entschleunigung, Entflechtung,
Entrümpelung, and Entkommerzialisierung), which I would translate as four ‘D’s’:
Deceleration, Deglobalization, Decluttering, and Decommodiﬁcation. In a book on
sufﬁciency policies another translator has called them the “four Lessens” because
these concepts “express the idea that we need to lessen our speed, our distance, the
encumbrance of our acquired possessions, and the role of commerce and the market
in our lives” (Schneidewind/Zahrnt 2014: 30).
I like the four D’s and summarize the key stance behind them by drawing on
terms that were introduced and discussed in this chapter:
• Deceleration—endless efﬁciency and increasing speed in all areas of production
and consumption reduce experienced utility and increase vulnerability of pro-
duction chains;
• Deglobalization—price-driven fragmentation of production chains and
transnational corporate units across the globe boosts proﬁts but widely exter-
nalizes ecological costs and avoids fair taxation;
• Decluttering—running after ever more stuff in competition with others reduces
the ability to really connect and enjoy each one of our items and also over-
stretches the Earth’s carrying capacity;
• Decommercialization—applying mental models of commodities and ﬁnancial
beneﬁts to all relationships leads to less quality of life, less concern for others or
the environment, and keeps governance blind to the physical and psychological
realities behind the numbers.
We can take more care of what we have, distribute it more sensibly and thor-
oughly, and innovate our production and consumption systems so they bring us into
a safe and just operating space. There clearly is enough to go round. Spending
patterns show that there is room for the reorientation of already existing wealth
without ruining lives. We do not need ever more output. We need different business
models, market patterns, money systems and the courage to let go of the exhausting
narrative that we are insatiable egoists trapped in a constant competitive race over
accumulation for accumulation’s sake and a fear of falling behind.
The good news is that the wider context of what could shape into a Second
Enlightenment movement holds this potential:
• Emphasis lies on reflexivity that takes circumstances into account when
undertaking intellectual and empirical investigations.
• Social sciences and the role of spirituality return to the realms of understanding
and explaining development patterns of the world.
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• Discourse around natural limits to growth meets an information technology
revolution that could enable decentralized, resource-light well-being.
• Limits to private property and ﬁnancialization are discussed as tenets for
securing all citizens’ freedoms and the functioning of democracy.
Where this type of thinking lies at the heart of developing businesses, towns,
governments, and communities is the topic we turn to now.
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